Approximation algorithms for scheduling unrelated parallel machines
Mathematical Programming: Series A and B
Algorithmic mechanism design (extended abstract)
STOC '99 Proceedings of the thirty-first annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
An approximate truthful mechanism for combinatorial auctions with single parameter agents
SODA '03 Proceedings of the fourteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Incentive compatible multi unit combinatorial auctions
Proceedings of the 9th conference on Theoretical aspects of rationality and knowledge
Truthful Mechanisms for One-Parameter Agents
FOCS '01 Proceedings of the 42nd IEEE symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Towards a Characterization of Truthful Combinatorial Auctions
FOCS '03 Proceedings of the 44th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Mechanisms for discrete optimization with rational agents
Mechanisms for discrete optimization with rational agents
Approximation techniques for utilitarian mechanism design
Proceedings of the thirty-seventh annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Approximation algorithms for combinatorial auctions with complement-free bidders
Proceedings of the thirty-seventh annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Weak monotonicity suffices for truthfulness on convex domains
Proceedings of the 6th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Truthful and Near-Optimal Mechanism Design via Linear Programming
FOCS '05 Proceedings of the 46th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Truthful randomized mechanisms for combinatorial auctions
Proceedings of the thirty-eighth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Truthful mechanism design for multi-dimensional scheduling via cycle monotonicity
Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Setting lower bounds on truthfulness: extended abstract
SODA '07 Proceedings of the eighteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
A lower bound for scheduling mechanisms
SODA '07 Proceedings of the eighteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Mechanism design for single-value domains
AAAI'05 Proceedings of the 20th national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Fast monotone 3-approximation algorithm for scheduling related machines
ESA'05 Proceedings of the 13th annual European conference on Algorithms
Truthful approximation mechanisms for scheduling selfish related machines
STACS'05 Proceedings of the 22nd annual conference on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science
Mechanism design for fractional scheduling on unrelated machines
ICALP'07 Proceedings of the 34th international conference on Automata, Languages and Programming
Recent developments in the mechanism design problem for scheduling
FAW-AAIM'11 Proceedings of the 5th joint international frontiers in algorithmics, and 7th international conference on Algorithmic aspects in information and management
Optimal Lower Bounds for Anonymous Scheduling Mechanisms
Mathematics of Operations Research
Envy-Free Makespan Approximation
SIAM Journal on Computing
Mechanisms for scheduling with single-bit private values
SAGT'12 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Algorithmic Game Theory
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Scheduling on unrelated machines is one of the most general and classical variants of the task scheduling problem. Fractional scheduling is the LP-relaxation of the problem, which is polynomially solvable in the nonstrategic setting, and is a useful tool to design deterministic and randomized approximation algorithms. The mechanism design version of the scheduling problem was introduced by Nisan and Ronen. In this article, we consider the mechanism design version of the fractional variant of this problem. We give lower bounds for any fractional truthful mechanism. Our lower bounds also hold for any (randomized) mechanism for the integral case. In the positive direction, we propose a truthful mechanism that achieves approximation 3/2 for 2 machines, matching the lower bound. This is the first new tight bound on the approximation ratio of this problem, after the tight bound of 2, for 2 machines, obtained by Nisan and Ronen. For n machines, our mechanism achieves an approximation ratio of n+1/2. Motivated by the fact that all the known deterministic and randomized mechanisms for the problem assign each task independently from the others, we focus on an interesting subclass of allocation algorithms, the task-independent algorithms. We give a lower bound of n+1/2, that holds for every (not only monotone) allocation algorithm that takes independent decisions. Under this consideration, our truthful independent mechanism is the best that we can hope from this family of algorithms.