Truthful Mechanisms for One-Parameter Agents
FOCS '01 Proceedings of the 42nd IEEE symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Setting lower bounds on truthfulness: extended abstract
SODA '07 Proceedings of the eighteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Algorithmic Game Theory
Randomized Truthful Mechanisms for Scheduling Unrelated Machines
WINE '08 Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
Truthful mechanisms for two-range-values variant of unrelated scheduling
Theoretical Computer Science
An optimal lower bound for anonymous scheduling mechanisms
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
A Lower Bound for Scheduling Mechanisms
Algorithmica
On 2-Player Randomized Mechanisms for Scheduling
WINE '09 Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
Mechanism design for fractional scheduling on unrelated machines
ACM Transactions on Algorithms (TALG)
A deterministic truthful PTAS for scheduling related machines
SODA '10 Proceedings of the twenty-first annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete Algorithms
Truthful Approximation Schemes for Single-Parameter Agents
SIAM Journal on Computing
A lower bound of 1 + ϕ for truthful scheduling mechanisms
MFCS'07 Proceedings of the 32nd international conference on Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science
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We consider randomized mechanisms for multi-dimensional scheduling. Following Lavi and Swamy [10], we study a setting with restrictions on the domain, while still preserving multi-dimensionality. In a sense, our setting is the simplest multi-dimensional setting, where each machine holds privately only a single-bit of information. We prove a separation between truthful-in-expectation and universally truthful mechanisms for makespan minimization: We first show how to design an optimal truthful-in-expectation mechanism, and then prove lower bounds on the approximation guarantee of universally truthful mechanisms.