Algorithmic mechanism design (extended abstract)
STOC '99 Proceedings of the thirty-first annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Truthful Mechanisms for One-Parameter Agents
FOCS '01 Proceedings of the 42nd IEEE symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Mechanisms for discrete optimization with rational agents
Mechanisms for discrete optimization with rational agents
Truthful Approximation Mechanisms for Scheduling Selfish Related Machines
Theory of Computing Systems
Algorithmic Game Theory
Truthful Approximation Schemes for Single-Parameter Agents
FOCS '08 Proceedings of the 2008 49th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Tighter approximation bounds for LPT scheduling in two special cases
Journal of Discrete Algorithms
Fast monotone 3-approximation algorithm for scheduling related machines
ESA'05 Proceedings of the 13th annual European conference on Algorithms
Truthful approximation mechanisms for scheduling selfish related machines
STACS'05 Proceedings of the 22nd annual conference on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science
Distributed algorithmic mechanism design for scheduling on unrelated machines
Journal of Parallel and Distributed Computing
A truthful constant approximation for maximizing the minimum load on related machines
WINE'10 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Internet and network economics
Multi-unit auctions: beyond roberts
Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
An impossibility result for truthful combinatorial auctions with submodular valuations
Proceedings of the forty-third annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Lower bound for envy-free and truthful makespan approximation on related machines
SAGT'11 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Algorithmic game theory
Truthful Approximation Schemes for Single-Parameter Agents
SIAM Journal on Computing
A global characterization of envy-free truthful scheduling of two tasks
WINE'11 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Internet and Network Economics
On the limits of black-box reductions in mechanism design
STOC '12 Proceedings of the forty-fourth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Optimal Lower Bounds for Anonymous Scheduling Mechanisms
Mathematics of Operations Research
Mechanisms for scheduling with single-bit private values
SAGT'12 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Algorithmic Game Theory
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Scheduling on related machines (Q||Cmax) is one of the most important problems in the field of Algorithmic Mechanism Design. Each machine is controlled by a selffish agent and her valuation can be expressed via a single parameter, her speed. Archer and Tardos [4] showed that, in contrast to other similar problems, a (non-polynomial) allocation that minimizes the makespan can be truthfully implemented. On the other hand, if we leave out the game-theoretic issues, the complexity of the problem has been completely settled --- the problem is strongly NP-hard, while there exists a PTAS [9, 8]. This problem is the most well-studied in single-parameter Algorithmic Mechanism Design. It gives an excellent ground to explore the boundary between truthfulness and efficient computation. Since the work of Archer and Tardos, quite a lot of deterministic and randomized mechanisms have been suggested. Recently, a breakthrough result [7] showed that a randomized, truthful-in-expectation PTAS exists. On the other hand, for the deterministic case, the best known approximation factor is 2.8 [10, 11]. It has been a major open question whether there exists a deterministic truthful PTAS, or whether truthfulness has an essential, negative impact on the computational complexity of the problem. In this paper we give a deffinitive answer to this important question by providing a truthful deterministic PTAS.