Truthful Mechanisms for One-Parameter Agents
FOCS '01 Proceedings of the 42nd IEEE symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Proceedings of the thirty-seventh annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Setting lower bounds on truthfulness: extended abstract
SODA '07 Proceedings of the eighteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
On characterizations of truthful mechanisms for combinatorial auctions and scheduling
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
A Characterization of 2-Player Mechanisms for Scheduling
ESA '08 Proceedings of the 16th annual European symposium on Algorithms
Truthful Approximation Schemes for Single-Parameter Agents
FOCS '08 Proceedings of the 2008 49th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Truthful mechanisms for two-range-values variant of unrelated scheduling
Theoretical Computer Science
A Lower Bound for Scheduling Mechanisms
Algorithmica
Mechanism design for fractional scheduling on unrelated machines
ACM Transactions on Algorithms (TALG)
A deterministic truthful PTAS for scheduling related machines
SODA '10 Proceedings of the twenty-first annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete Algorithms
A lower bound of 1 + ϕ for truthful scheduling mechanisms
MFCS'07 Proceedings of the 32nd international conference on Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science
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We consider the problem of designing truthful mechanisms on m unrelated machines, to minimize some optimization goal. Nisan and Ronen [Nisan, N., A. Ronen. 2001. Algorithmic mechanism design. Games Econom. Behav.35 166--196] consider the specific goal of makespan minimization, and show a lower bound of 2, and an upper bound of m. This large gap inspired many attempts that yielded positive results for several special cases, but very partial success for the general case: the lower bound was slightly increased to 2.61 by Christodoulou et al. [Christodoulou, G., E. Koutsoupias, A. Kovács. 2010. Mechanism design for fractional scheduling on unrelated machines. ACM Trans. Algorithms (TALG)6(2) 1--18] and Koutsoupias and Vidali [Koutsoupias, E., A. Vidali. 2007. A lower bound of 1+phi for truthful scheduling mechanisms. Proc. 32nd Internat. Sympos. Math. Foundations Comput. Sci. (MFCS)], while the best upper bound remains unchanged. In this paper we show the optimal lower bound on truthful anonymous mechanisms: no such mechanism can guarantee an approximation ratio better than m. Moreover, our proof yields similar optimal bounds for two other optimization goals: the sum of completion times and the lp norm of the schedule.