A Lower Bound for Scheduling Mechanisms

Authors:
George Christodoulou;Elias Koutsoupias;Angelina Vidali
Affiliations:
Max-Planck-Institut für Informatik, Saarbrücken, Germany;University of Athens, Department of Informatics, Athens, Greece;University of Athens, Department of Informatics, Athens, Greece
Venue:
Algorithmica
Year:
2009

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Abstract

We study the mechanism design problem of scheduling tasks on n unrelated machines in which the machines are the players of the mechanism. The problem was proposed and studied in the seminal paper of Nisan and Ronen on algorithmic mechanism design, where it was shown that the approximation ratio of mechanisms is between 2 and n. We improve the lower bound to $1+\sqrt{2}$for 3 or more machines.