Truth revelation in approximately efficient combinatorial auctions
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Incentive compatible multi unit combinatorial auctions
Proceedings of the 9th conference on Theoretical aspects of rationality and knowledge
Truthful Mechanisms for One-Parameter Agents
FOCS '01 Proceedings of the 42nd IEEE symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Towards a Characterization of Truthful Combinatorial Auctions
FOCS '03 Proceedings of the 44th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Approximation techniques for utilitarian mechanism design
Proceedings of the thirty-seventh annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Weak monotonicity suffices for truthfulness on convex domains
Proceedings of the 6th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
On profit-maximizing envy-free pricing
SODA '05 Proceedings of the sixteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Truthful mechanism design for multi-dimensional scheduling via cycle monotonicity
Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
A lower bound for scheduling mechanisms
SODA '07 Proceedings of the eighteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Algorithmic Game Theory
On characterizations of truthful mechanisms for combinatorial auctions and scheduling
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Optimal envy-free pricing with metric substitutability
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Uniform Budgets and the Envy-Free Pricing Problem
ICALP '08 Proceedings of the 35th international colloquium on Automata, Languages and Programming, Part I
A Characterization of 2-Player Mechanisms for Scheduling
ESA '08 Proceedings of the 16th annual European symposium on Algorithms
An optimal lower bound for anonymous scheduling mechanisms
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Combination Can Be Hard: Approximability of the Unique Coverage Problem
SIAM Journal on Computing
On Multi-dimensional Envy-Free Mechanisms
ADT '09 Proceedings of the 1st International Conference on Algorithmic Decision Theory
Envy-Free Allocations for Budgeted Bidders
WINE '09 Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
Dynamic pricing for impatient bidders
ACM Transactions on Algorithms (TALG)
Envy-free makespan approximation: extended abstract
Proceedings of the 11th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
A deterministic truthful PTAS for scheduling related machines
SODA '10 Proceedings of the twenty-first annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete Algorithms
Multi-unit auctions: beyond roberts
Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Lower bound for envy-free and truthful makespan approximation on related machines
SAGT'11 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Algorithmic game theory
A lower bound of 1 + ϕ for truthful scheduling mechanisms
MFCS'07 Proceedings of the 32nd international conference on Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science
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We study envy-free and truthful mechanisms for domains with additive valuations, like the ones that arise in scheduling on unrelated machines. We investigate the allocation functions that are both weakly monotone (truthful) and locally efficient (envy-free), in the case of only two tasks, but many players. We show that the only allocation functions that satisfy both conditions are affine minimizers, with strong restrictions on the parameters of the affine minimizer. As a further result, we provide a common payment function, i.e., a single mechanism that is both truthful and envy-free. For additive combinatorial auctions our approach leads us (only) to a non- affine maximizer similar to the counterexample of Lavi et al. [26]. Thus our result demonstrates the inherent difference between the scheduling and the auctions domain, and inspires new questions related to the classic problem of characterizing truthfulness in additive domains.