Truth revelation in approximately efficient combinatorial auctions
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
An approximate truthful mechanism for combinatorial auctions with single parameter agents
SODA '03 Proceedings of the fourteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Approximation algorithms for combinatorial auctions with complement-free bidders
Proceedings of the thirty-seventh annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Truthful and Near-Optimal Mechanism Design via Linear Programming
FOCS '05 Proceedings of the 46th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
An improved approximation algorithm for combinatorial auctions with submodular bidders
SODA '06 Proceedings of the seventeenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithm
Limitations of VCG-based mechanisms
Proceedings of the thirty-ninth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Algorithmic Game Theory
Optimal approximation for the submodular welfare problem in the value oracle model
STOC '08 Proceedings of the fortieth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Tight information-theoretic lower bounds for welfare maximization in combinatorial auctions
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Single-value combinatorial auctions and algorithmic implementation in undominated strategies
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
On the Hardness of Being Truthful
FOCS '08 Proceedings of the 2008 49th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
ICALP '09 Proceedings of the 36th Internatilonal Collogquium on Automata, Languages and Programming: Part II
Bayesian algorithmic mechanism design
Proceedings of the forty-second ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Inapproximability for VCG-based combinatorial auctions
SODA '10 Proceedings of the twenty-first annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete Algorithms
Black-box reductions in mechanism design
APPROX'11/RANDOM'11 Proceedings of the 14th international workshop and 15th international conference on Approximation, randomization, and combinatorial optimization: algorithms and techniques
On the limits of black-box reductions in mechanism design
STOC '12 Proceedings of the forty-fourth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
| Hi-index | 0.00 |
We consider the problem of designing truthful auctions, when the bidders' valuations have a public and a private component. In particular, we consider combinatorial auctions where the valuation of an agent i for a set S of items can be expressed as vif(S), where vi is a private single parameter of the agent, and the function f is publicly known. Our motivation behind studying this problem is two-fold: (a) Such valuation functions arise naturally in the case of ad-slots in broadcast media such as Television and Radio. For an ad shown in a set S of ad-slots, f(S) is, say, the number of unique viewers reached by the ad, and vi is the valuation per-unique-viewer. (b) From a theoretical point of view, this factorization of the valuation function simplifies the bidding language, and renders the combinatorial auction more amenable to better approximation factors. We present a general technique, based on maximal-in-range mechanisms, that converts any α-approximation non-truthful algorithm (α ≥ 1) for this problem into Ω(α/log n) and Ω(α)-approximate truthful mechanisms which run in polynomial time and quasi-polynomial time, respectively.