Bayesian Combinatorial Auctions
ICALP '08 Proceedings of the 35th international colloquium on Automata, Languages and Programming, Part I
Mechanisms for multi-unit auctions
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Price of anarchy for greedy auctions
SODA '10 Proceedings of the twenty-first annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete Algorithms
Non-price equilibria in markets of discrete goods
Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
A universally-truthful approximation scheme for multi-unit auctions
Proceedings of the twenty-third annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete Algorithms
Sequential auctions and externalities
Proceedings of the twenty-third annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete Algorithms
Welfare guarantees for combinatorial auctions with item bidding
Proceedings of the twenty-second annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete Algorithms
Simultaneous auctions are (almost) efficient
Proceedings of the forty-fifth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Composable and efficient mechanisms
Proceedings of the forty-fifth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
| Hi-index | 0.00 |
We present our results on Uniform Price Auctions, one of the standard sealed-bid multi-unit auction formats, for selling multiple identical units of a single good to multi-demand bidders. Contrary to the truthful and economically efficient multi-unit Vickrey auction, the Uniform Price Auction encourages strategic bidding and is socially inefficient in general, partly due to a "Demand Reduction" effect; bidders tend to bid for fewer (identical) units, so as to receive them at a lower uniform price. Despite its inefficiency, the uniform pricing rule is widely popular by its appeal to the natural anticipation, that identical items should be identically priced. Application domains of its variants include sales of U.S. Treasury bonds to investors, trade exchanges over the internet facilitated by popular online brokers, allocation of radio spectrum licenses etc. In this work we study equilibria of the Uniform Price Auction in undominated strategies. We characterize a class of undominated pure Nash equilibria and quantify the social inefficiency of pure and (mixed) Bayes-Nash equilibria by means of bounds on the Price of Anarchy.