Online algorithms for selective multicast and maximal dense trees
STOC '97 Proceedings of the twenty-ninth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
New Approximation Guarantees for Minimum-Weight k-Trees and Prize-Collecting Salesmen
SIAM Journal on Computing
Algorithmic mechanism design (extended abstract)
STOC '99 Proceedings of the thirty-first annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
SODA '94 Proceedings of the fifth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Competitive routing of virtual circuits with unknown duration
SODA '94 Proceedings of the fifth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Online througput-competitive algorithm for multicast routing and admission control
Proceedings of the ninth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Sharing the cost of muliticast transmissions (preliminary version)
STOC '00 Proceedings of the thirty-second annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Competitive analysis of incentive compatible on-line auctions
Proceedings of the 2nd ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Competitive auctions and digital goods
SODA '01 Proceedings of the twelfth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Incentive-compatible online auctions for digital goods
SODA '02 Proceedings of the thirteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
SODA '02 Proceedings of the thirteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Mechanism design for online real-time scheduling
EC '04 Proceedings of the 5th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Adaptive limited-supply online auctions
EC '04 Proceedings of the 5th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
On the expected payment of mechanisms for task allocation
Proceedings of the twenty-third annual ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing
Approximation techniques for utilitarian mechanism design
Proceedings of the thirty-seventh annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Online auctions with re-usable goods
Proceedings of the 6th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Online ascending auctions for gradually expiring items
SODA '05 Proceedings of the sixteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Single-value combinatorial auctions and implementation in undominated strategies
SODA '06 Proceedings of the seventeenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithm
Truthful unsplittable flow for large capacity networks
Proceedings of the nineteenth annual ACM symposium on Parallel algorithms and architectures
Fault tolerant mechanism design
Artificial Intelligence
Reducing mechanism design to algorithm design via machine learning
Journal of Computer and System Sciences
Single-value combinatorial auctions and algorithmic implementation in undominated strategies
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Automated online mechanism design and prophet inequalities
AAAI'07 Proceedings of the 22nd national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
An ironing-based approach to adaptive online mechanism design in single-valued domains
AAAI'07 Proceedings of the 22nd national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Truthful unsplittable flow for large capacity networks
ACM Transactions on Algorithms (TALG)
Dynamic Auction Mechanism for Cloud Resource Allocation
CCGRID '10 Proceedings of the 2010 10th IEEE/ACM International Conference on Cluster, Cloud and Grid Computing
Algorithms and theory of computation handbook
Incentives in online auctions via linear programming
WINE'10 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Internet and network economics
Secretary problems via linear programming
IPCO'10 Proceedings of the 14th international conference on Integer Programming and Combinatorial Optimization
Approximation Techniques for Utilitarian Mechanism Design
SIAM Journal on Computing
Online mechanism design (randomized rounding on the fly)
ICALP'12 Proceedings of the 39th international colloquium conference on Automata, Languages, and Programming - Volume Part II
Hi-index | 0.00 |
We describe a general technique for converting an online algorithm Β to a truthtelling mechanism. We require that the original online competitive algorithm has certain "niceness" properties in that actions on future requests are independent of the actual value of requests which were accepted (though these actions will of course depend upon the set of accepted requests). Under these conditions, we are able to give an online truthtelling mechanism (where the values of requests are given by bids which may not accurately represent the valuation of the requesters) such that our total profit is within O(ρ + log μ) of the optimum offline profit obtained by an omniscient algorithm (one which knows the true valuations of the users). Here ρ is the competitive ratio of Β for the optimization version of the problem, and μ is the ratio of the maximum to minimum valuation for a request. In general there is an Ω(log μ) lower bound on the ratio of worst-case profit for a truthtelling mechanism when compared to the profit obtained by an omniscient algorithm, so this result is in some sense best possible. In addition, we prove that our construction is resilient against many forms of "cheating" attempts, such as forming coalitions.We demonstrate applications of this result to several problems. We develop online truthtelling mechanisms for online routing and admission control of path or multicast requests, assuming large network capacities. Assuming the existance of an algorithm Β for the optimization version of the problem, our techniques provide truthtelling mechanisms for general combinatorial auctions. However, designing optimization algorithms may be difficult in general because of online or approximation lower bounds. For the cases described above, we are able to design optimization algorithms Β by amortizing the lost benefit from online computation (and from approximation hardness in the case of multicast) against the benefit obtained from accepted requests.We comment that our upper bounds on profit competitiveness imply, as an obvious corollary, similar bound on global efficiency, namely overall well-being of all the users. This contrasts with most other work on truthtelling mechanisms for general online resource allocation, where only efficiency is maximized, and competitiveness can be arbitrarily poor.