Online computation and competitive analysis
Online computation and competitive analysis
Combinatorial auctions with decreasing marginal utilities
Proceedings of the 3rd ACM conference on Electronic Commerce
Reducing truth-telling online mechanisms to online optimization
Proceedings of the thirty-fifth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Incentive compatible multi unit combinatorial auctions
Proceedings of the 9th conference on Theoretical aspects of rationality and knowledge
A multiple-choice secretary algorithm with applications to online auctions
SODA '05 Proceedings of the sixteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Truthful and Near-Optimal Mechanism Design via Linear Programming
FOCS '05 Proceedings of the 46th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
On maximizing welfare when utility functions are subadditive
Proceedings of the thirty-eighth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Truthful randomized mechanisms for combinatorial auctions
Proceedings of the thirty-eighth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Improved Bounds for Online Routing and Packing Via a Primal-Dual Approach
FOCS '06 Proceedings of the 47th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Matroids, secretary problems, and online mechanisms
SODA '07 Proceedings of the eighteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Throughput-competitive on-line routing
SFCS '93 Proceedings of the 1993 IEEE 34th Annual Foundations of Computer Science
Two Randomized Mechanisms for Combinatorial Auctions
APPROX '07/RANDOM '07 Proceedings of the 10th International Workshop on Approximation and the 11th International Workshop on Randomization, and Combinatorial Optimization. Algorithms and Techniques
Algorithms for Secretary Problems on Graphs and Hypergraphs
ICALP '09 Proceedings of the 36th Internatilonal Collogquium on Automata, Languages and Programming: Part II
On Maximizing Welfare When Utility Functions Are Subadditive
SIAM Journal on Computing
Online primal-dual algorithms for covering and packing problems
ESA'05 Proceedings of the 13th annual European conference on Algorithms
On k-column sparse packing programs
IPCO'10 Proceedings of the 14th international conference on Integer Programming and Combinatorial Optimization
Truthfulness and stochastic dominance with monetary transfers
Proceedings of the fourteenth ACM conference on Electronic commerce
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We study incentive compatible mechanisms for combinatorial auctions (CAs) in an online model with sequentially arriving bidders, where the arrivals' order is either random or adversarial. The bidders' valuations are given by demand oracles. Previously known online mechanisms for CAs assume that each item is available at a certain multiplicity b1. Typically, one assumes b=Ω(logm), where m is the number of different items. We present the first online mechanisms guaranteeing competitiveness for any multiplicity b≥1. We introduce an online variant of oblivious randomized rounding enabling us to prove competitive ratios that are close to or even beat the best known offline approximation factors for various CAs settings. Our mechanisms are universally truthful, and they significantly improve on the previously known mechanisms.