Analysis and simulation of a fair queueing algorithm
SIGCOMM '89 Symposium proceedings on Communications architectures & protocols
SODA '02 Proceedings of the thirteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Truth revelation in approximately efficient combinatorial auctions
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Truthful Mechanisms for One-Parameter Agents
FOCS '01 Proceedings of the 42nd IEEE symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Towards a Characterization of Truthful Combinatorial Auctions
FOCS '03 Proceedings of the 44th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Weak monotonicity suffices for truthfulness on convex domains
Proceedings of the 6th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Optimal Mechanisms with Finite Agent Types
Management Science
Truthful mechanism design for multi-dimensional scheduling via cycle monotonicity
Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Setting lower bounds on truthfulness: extended abstract
SODA '07 Proceedings of the eighteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
A lower bound for scheduling mechanisms
SODA '07 Proceedings of the eighteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Algorithmic Game Theory
Mechanism design for fractional scheduling on unrelated machines
ICALP'07 Proceedings of the 34th international conference on Automata, Languages and Programming
Implementable allocation rules
ACM SIGecom Exchanges
Characterizing truthfulness in discrete domains
ACM SIGecom Exchanges
Characterizing false-name-proof allocation rules in combinatorial auctions
Proceedings of The 8th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 1
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Often, we wish to design incentive-compatible algorithms for settings in which the players' private information is drawn from discrete domains (e.g., integer values). Our main result is identifying discrete settings in which an algorithm can be made incentive-compatible iff the function it computes upholds a simple monotonicity constraint, known as weak-monotonicity. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first such characterization of incentive-compatibility in discrete domains (such characterizations were previously known only for inherently non-discrete domains, e.g., convex domains). We demonstrate the usefulness of this result by showing an application to the TCP-inspired congestion-control problem presented in [20].