Algorithmic mechanism design (extended abstract)
STOC '99 Proceedings of the thirty-first annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
The Price of Stability for Network Design with Fair Cost Allocation
FOCS '04 Proceedings of the 45th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Setting lower bounds on truthfulness: extended abstract
SODA '07 Proceedings of the eighteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Algorithmic Game Theory
Collusion-Resistant Mechanisms with Verification Yielding Optimal Solutions
ESA '08 Proceedings of the 16th annual European symposium on Algorithms
Approximate mechanism design without money
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
On truthfulness and approximation for scheduling selfish tasks
Journal of Scheduling
Tighter Bounds for Facility Games
WINE '09 Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
Asymptotically optimal strategy-proof mechanisms for two-facility games
Proceedings of the 11th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Truthful assignment without money
Proceedings of the 11th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Strategy-proof allocation of multiple items between two agents without payments or priors
Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems: volume 1 - Volume 1
Winner-imposing strategyproof mechanisms for multiple facility location games
WINE'10 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Internet and network economics
Computer Science Review
A lower bound of 1 + ϕ for truthful scheduling mechanisms
MFCS'07 Proceedings of the 32nd international conference on Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science
Mechanism design for fractional scheduling on unrelated machines
ICALP'07 Proceedings of the 34th international conference on Automata, Languages and Programming
Scheduling selfish tasks: about the performance of truthful algorithms
COCOON'07 Proceedings of the 13th annual international conference on Computing and Combinatorics
| Hi-index | 0.00 |
We consider mechanisms without payments for the problem of scheduling unrelated machines. Specifically, we consider truthful in expectation randomized mechanisms under the assumption that a machine (player) is bound by its reports: when a machine lies and reports value $\tilde{t}_{ij}$ for a task instead of the actual one tij, it will execute for time $\tilde{t}_{ij}$ if it gets the task (unless the declared value $\tilde{t}_{ij}$ is less than the actual value tij, in which case, it will execute for time tij). Our main technical result is an optimal mechanism for one task and n players which has approximation ratio (n+1)/2. We also provide a matching lower bound, showing that no other truthful mechanism can achieve a better approximation ratio. This immediately gives an approximation ratio of (n+1)/2 and n(n+1)/2 for social cost and makespan minimization, respectively, for any number of tasks. We also study the price of anarchy of natural algorithms.