An approximation algorithm for the generalized assignment problem
Mathematical Programming: Series A and B
A PTAS for the multiple knapsack problem
SODA '00 Proceedings of the eleventh annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Truthful Mechanisms for One-Parameter Agents
FOCS '01 Proceedings of the 42nd IEEE symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Towards a Characterization of Truthful Combinatorial Auctions
FOCS '03 Proceedings of the 44th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Approximation techniques for utilitarian mechanism design
Proceedings of the thirty-seventh annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Truthful and Near-Optimal Mechanism Design via Linear Programming
FOCS '05 Proceedings of the 46th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Tight approximation algorithms for maximum general assignment problems
SODA '06 Proceedings of the seventeenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithm
Approximation algorithms for allocation problems: Improving the factor of 1 - 1/e
FOCS '06 Proceedings of the 47th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Algorithmic Game Theory
Truthful Unification Framework for Packing Integer Programs with Choices
ICALP '08 Proceedings of the 35th international colloquium on Automata, Languages and Programming, Part I
Approximate mechanism design without money
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Proceedings of the 11th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Proceedings of the 11th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Tight bounds for strategyproof classification
The 10th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 1
Social welfare in one-sided matching markets without money
APPROX'11/RANDOM'11 Proceedings of the 14th international workshop and 15th international conference on Approximation, randomization, and combinatorial optimization: algorithms and techniques
Truthful and Near-Optimal Mechanism Design via Linear Programming
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
SAGT'11 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Algorithmic game theory
Algorithms for strategyproof classification
Artificial Intelligence
Mechanism design on discrete lines and cycles
Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce
Funding games: the truth but not the whole truth
WINE'12 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Internet and Network Economics
Strategyproof facility location and the least squares objective
Proceedings of the fourteenth ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Approximate Mechanism Design without Money
ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation
Theory of Computing Systems
Hi-index | 0.00 |
We study the design of truthful mechanisms that do not use payments for the generalized assignment problem (GAP) and its variants. An instance of the GAP consists of a bipartite graph with jobs on one side and machines on the other. Machines have capacities and edges have values and sizes; the goal is to construct a welfare maximizing feasible assignment. In our model of private valuations, motivated by impossibility results, the value and sizes on all job-machine pairs are public information; however, whether an edge exists or not in the bipartite graph is a job's private information. That is, the selfish agents in our model are the jobs, and their private information is their edge set. We want to design mechanisms that are truthful without money (henceforth strategyproof), and produce assignments whose welfare is a good approximation to the optimal omniscient welfare. We study several variants of the GAP starting with matching. For the unweighted version, we give an optimal strategyproof mechanism. For maximum weight bipartite matching, we show that no strategyproof mechanism, deterministic or randomized, can be optimal, and present a 2-approximate strategyproof mechanism along with a matching lowerbound. Next we study knapsack-like problems, which, unlike matching, are NP-hard. For these problems, we develop a general LP-based technique that extends the ideas of Lavi and Swamy [14] to reduce designing a truthful approximate mechanism without money to designing such a mechanism for the fractional version of the problem. We design strategyproof approximate mechanisms for the fractional relaxations of multiple knapsack, size-invariant GAP, and value-invariant GAP, and use this technique to obtain, respectively, 2, 4 and 4-approximate strategyproof mechanisms for these problems. We then design an O(log n)-approximate strategyproof mechanism for the GAP by reducing, with logarithmic loss in the approximation, to our solution for the value-invariant GAP. Our technique may be of independent interest for designing truthful mechanisms without money for other LP-based problems.