Approximation algorithms for geometric problems
Approximation algorithms for NP-hard problems
Approximation schemes for Euclidean k-medians and related problems
STOC '98 Proceedings of the thirtieth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Truth revelation in approximately efficient combinatorial auctions
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Truthful Mechanisms for One-Parameter Agents
FOCS '01 Proceedings of the 42nd IEEE symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Group Strategyproof Mechanisms via Primal-Dual Algorithms
FOCS '03 Proceedings of the 44th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
SODA '04 Proceedings of the fifteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Cross-monotonic cost-sharing methods for connected facility location games
EC '04 Proceedings of the 5th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Truthful and Near-Optimal Mechanism Design via Linear Programming
FOCS '05 Proceedings of the 46th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
ACM SIGecom Exchanges
Truthful randomized mechanisms for combinatorial auctions
Proceedings of the thirty-eighth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
ACM Transactions on Algorithms (TALG)
Truthful mechanism design for multi-dimensional scheduling via cycle monotonicity
Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
A lower bound for scheduling mechanisms
SODA '07 Proceedings of the eighteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Some results on approximating the minimax solution in approval voting
Proceedings of the 6th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
STOC '08 Proceedings of the fortieth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Truthful Approximation Schemes for Single-Parameter Agents
FOCS '08 Proceedings of the 2008 49th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Tighter Bounds for Facility Games
WINE '09 Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
Competitive Repeated Allocation without Payments
WINE '09 Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
Proceedings of the 11th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Asymptotically optimal strategy-proof mechanisms for two-facility games
Proceedings of the 11th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Truthful assignment without money
Proceedings of the 11th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
On the limits of dictatorial classification
Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems: volume 1 - Volume 1
Strategy-proof allocation of multiple items between two agents without payments or priors
Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems: volume 1 - Volume 1
Incentive compatible regression learning
Journal of Computer and System Sciences
Winner-imposing strategyproof mechanisms for multiple facility location games
WINE'10 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Internet and network economics
On (group) strategy-proof mechanisms without payment for facility location games
WINE'10 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Internet and network economics
False-name-proofness in facility location problem on the real line
WINE'10 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Internet and network economics
Individual rationality and participation in large scale, multi-hospital kidney exchange
Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Sum of us: strategyproof selection from the selectors
Proceedings of the 13th Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge
SAGT'11 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Algorithmic game theory
Approximately optimal mechanism design via differential privacy
Proceedings of the 3rd Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference
Truthful approximation mechanisms for scheduling selfish related machines
STACS'05 Proceedings of the 22nd annual conference on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science
An improved 2-agent kidney exchange mechanism
WINE'11 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Internet and Network Economics
Algorithms for strategyproof classification
Artificial Intelligence
Strategy-proof approximation mechanisms for an obnoxious facility game on networks
Theoretical Computer Science
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The literature on algorithmic mechanism design is mostly concerned with game-theoretic versions of optimization problems to which standard economic money-based mechanisms cannot be applied efficiently. Recent years have seen the design of various truthful approximation mechanisms that rely on payments. In this article, we advocate the reconsideration of highly structured optimization problems in the context of mechanism design. We explicitly argue for the first time that, in such domains, approximation can be leveraged to obtain truthfulness without resorting to payments. This stands in contrast to previous work where payments are almost ubiquitous and (more often than not) approximation is a necessary evil that is required to circumvent computational complexity. We present a case study in approximate mechanism design without money. In our basic setting, agents are located on the real line and the mechanism must select the location of a public facility; the cost of an agent is its distance to the facility. We establish tight upper and lower bounds for the approximation ratio given by strategyproof mechanisms without payments, with respect to both deterministic and randomized mechanisms, under two objective functions: the social cost and the maximum cost. We then extend our results in two natural directions: a domain where two facilities must be located and a domain where each agent controls multiple locations.