Competitive generalized auctions
STOC '02 Proceedings of the thiry-fourth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Sybilproof reputation mechanisms
Proceedings of the 2005 ACM SIGCOMM workshop on Economics of peer-to-peer systems
Truthful randomized mechanisms for combinatorial auctions
Proceedings of the thirty-eighth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Some results on approximating the minimax solution in approval voting
Proceedings of the 6th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
Strategyproof deterministic lotteries under broadcast communication
Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - Volume 3
Approximate mechanism design without money
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Axiomatic foundations for ranking systems
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Nonmanipulable selections from a tournament
IJCAI'09 Proceedings of the 21st international jont conference on Artifical intelligence
Incentive compatible regression learning
Journal of Computer and System Sciences
On the competitive ratio of the random sampling auction
WINE'05 Proceedings of the First international conference on Internet and Network Economics
Funding games: the truth but not the whole truth
WINE'12 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Internet and Network Economics
Incentive compatible two player cake cutting
WINE'12 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Internet and Network Economics
Approximate Mechanism Design without Money
ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation
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We consider the special case of approval voting when the set of agents and the set of alternatives coincide. This captures situations in which the members of an organization want to elect a president or a committee from their ranks, as well as a variety of problems in networked environments, for example in internet search, social networks like Twitter, or reputation systems like Epinions. More precisely, we look at a setting where each member of a set of n agents approves or disapproves of any other member of the set and we want to select a subset of k agents, for a given value of k, in a strategyproof and approximately efficient way. Here, strategyproofness means that no agent can improve its own chances of being selected by changing the set of other agents it approves. A mechanism is said to provide an approximation ratio of α for some α ≥ 1 if the ratio between the sum of approval scores of any set of size k and that of the set selected by the mechanism is always at most α. We show that for k ∈ {1, 2,..., n − 1}, no deterministic strategyproof mechanism can provide a finite approximation ratio. We then present a randomized strategyproof mechanism that provides an approximation ratio that is bounded from above by four for any value of k, and approaches one as k grows.