Approximate mechanism design without money
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
The Efficiency of Fair Division
WINE '09 Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
SAGT'10 Proceedings of the Third international conference on Algorithmic game theory
Sum of us: strategyproof selection from the selectors
Proceedings of the 13th Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge
Incentive compatible two player cake cutting
WINE'12 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Internet and Network Economics
Incentive compatible two player cake cutting
WINE'12 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Internet and Network Economics
Mechanism design for fair division: allocating divisible items without payments
Proceedings of the fourteenth ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Equilibrium analysis in cake cutting
Proceedings of the 2013 international conference on Autonomous agents and multi-agent systems
Computing socially-efficient cake divisions
Proceedings of the 2013 international conference on Autonomous agents and multi-agent systems
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We characterize methods of dividing a cake between two bidders in a way that is incentive-compatible and Pareto-efficient. In our cake cutting model, each bidder desires a subset of the cake (with a uniform value over this subset), and is allocated some subset. Our characterization proceeds via reducing to a simple one-dimensional version of the problem, and yields, for example, a tight bound on the social welfare achievable.