Fairness measures for resource allocation
FOCS '00 Proceedings of the 41st Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
On approximately fair allocations of indivisible goods
EC '04 Proceedings of the 5th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Cake cutting really is not a piece of cake
SODA '06 Proceedings of the seventeenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithm
Proceedings of the thirty-eighth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
The Price of Stability for Network Design with Fair Cost Allocation
SIAM Journal on Computing
Thou shalt covet thy neighbor's cake
IJCAI'09 Proceedings of the 21st international jont conference on Artifical intelligence
On the complexity of cake cutting
Discrete Optimization
The efficiency of fair division with connected pieces
WINE'10 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Internet and network economics
Throw one's cake: and eat it too
SAGT'11 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Algorithmic game theory
Fair solutions for some multiagent optimization problems
Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems
Incentive compatible two player cake cutting
WINE'12 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Internet and Network Economics
Cake cutting: not just child's play
Communications of the ACM
Computing socially-efficient cake divisions
Proceedings of the 2013 international conference on Autonomous agents and multi-agent systems
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We study the impact of fairness on the efficiency of allocations. We consider three different notions of fairness, namely proportionality, envy-freeness, and equitability for allocations of divisible and indivisible goods and chores. We present a series of results on the price of fairness under the three different notions that quantify the efficiency loss in fair allocations compared to optimal ones. Most of our bounds are either exact or tight within constant factors. Our study is of an optimistic nature and aims to identify the potential of fairness in allocations.