Cake-Cutting Is Not a Piece of Cake
STACS '03 Proceedings of the 20th Annual Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science
The Price of Stability for Network Design with Fair Cost Allocation
FOCS '04 Proceedings of the 45th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Cake cutting really is not a piece of cake
SODA '06 Proceedings of the seventeenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithm
Thou shalt covet thy neighbor's cake
IJCAI'09 Proceedings of the 21st international jont conference on Artifical intelligence
The Efficiency of Fair Division
WINE '09 Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
Throw one's cake: and eat it too
SAGT'11 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Algorithmic game theory
Fair solutions for some multiagent optimization problems
Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems
On the existence of equitable cake divisions
Information Sciences: an International Journal
Cake cutting: not just child's play
Communications of the ACM
Computing socially-efficient cake divisions
Proceedings of the 2013 international conference on Autonomous agents and multi-agent systems
| Hi-index | 0.02 |
We consider the issue of fair division of goods, using the cake cutting abstraction, and aim to bound the possible degradation in social welfare due to the fairness requirements. Previous work has considered this problem for the setting where the division may allocate each player any number of unconnected pieces. Here, we consider the setting where each player must receive a single connected piece. For this setting, we provide tight bounds on the maximum possible degradation to both utilitarian and egalitarian welfare due to three fairness criteria -- proportionality, envy-freeness and equitability.