Applications of approximation algorithms to cooperative games
STOC '01 Proceedings of the thirty-third annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Strategyproof cost-sharing mechanisms for set cover and facility location games
Proceedings of the 4th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Simpler and better approximation algorithms for network design
Proceedings of the thirty-fifth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Group Strategyproof Mechanisms via Primal-Dual Algorithms
FOCS '03 Proceedings of the 44th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
New trade-offs in cost-sharing mechanisms
Proceedings of the thirty-eighth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Limitations of cross-monotonic cost-sharing schemes
ACM Transactions on Algorithms (TALG)
Optimal Efficiency Guarantees for Network Design Mechanisms
IPCO '07 Proceedings of the 12th international conference on Integer Programming and Combinatorial Optimization
Fair cost-sharing methods for scheduling jobs on parallel machines
Journal of Discrete Algorithms
Approximate mechanism design without money
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
On achieving group strategyproof information dissemination in wireless networks
GameNets'09 Proceedings of the First ICST international conference on Game Theory for Networks
Optimal cost-sharing mechanisms for steiner forest problems
WINE'06 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Internet and Network Economics
The algorithmic structure of group strategyproof budget-balanced cost-sharing mechanisms
STACS'06 Proceedings of the 23rd Annual conference on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science
Fair cost-sharing methods for scheduling jobs on parallel machines
CIAC'06 Proceedings of the 6th Italian conference on Algorithms and Complexity
Free-riders in steiner tree cost-sharing games
SIROCCO'05 Proceedings of the 12th international conference on Structural Information and Communication Complexity
Price of Correlations in Stochastic Optimization
Operations Research
The power of two prices: beyond cross-monotonicity
MFCS'07 Proceedings of the 32nd international conference on Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science
Approximate Mechanism Design without Money
ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation
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We devise cost sharing methods for connected facility location games that are cross-monotonic, competitive and recover a constant fraction of the optimal cost.The novelty of this work is that we use randomized algorithms and that we share the expected cost among the participating users. We also provide a primal-dual cost sharing method for the connected facility location game with opening costs.