Using dual approximation algorithms for scheduling problems theoretical and practical results
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Tighter bounds for LPT scheduling on uniform processors
SIAM Journal on Computing
Applications of approximation algorithms to cooperative games
STOC '01 Proceedings of the thirty-third annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Sharing the cost of multicast transmissions
Journal of Computer and System Sciences - Special issue on Internet algorithms
The Structure and Complexity of Nash Equilibria for a Selfish Routing Game
ICALP '02 Proceedings of the 29th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages and Programming
Strategyproof cost-sharing mechanisms for set cover and facility location games
Proceedings of the 4th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Truthful Mechanisms for One-Parameter Agents
FOCS '01 Proceedings of the 42nd IEEE symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Hardness results for multicast cost sharing
Theoretical Computer Science
Group Strategyproof Mechanisms via Primal-Dual Algorithms
FOCS '03 Proceedings of the 44th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Cross-monotonic cost-sharing methods for connected facility location games
EC '04 Proceedings of the 5th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Sharing the cost more efficiently: improved approximation for multicommodity rent-or-buy
SODA '05 Proceedings of the sixteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Limitations of cross-monotonic cost sharing schemes
SODA '05 Proceedings of the sixteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
A group-strategyproof mechanism for Steiner forests
SODA '05 Proceedings of the sixteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
A lower bound for scheduling mechanisms
SODA '07 Proceedings of the eighteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
The algorithmic structure of group strategyproof budget-balanced cost-sharing mechanisms
STACS'06 Proceedings of the 23rd Annual conference on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science
Nash equilibria, the price of anarchy and the fully mixed nash equilibrium conjecture
ICALP'05 Proceedings of the 32nd international conference on Automata, Languages and Programming
From primal-dual to cost shares and back: a stronger LP relaxation for the steiner forest problem
ICALP'05 Proceedings of the 32nd international conference on Automata, Languages and Programming
New constructions of mechanisms with verification
ICALP'06 Proceedings of the 33rd international conference on Automata, Languages and Programming - Volume Part I
Truthful approximation mechanisms for scheduling selfish related machines
STACS'05 Proceedings of the 22nd annual conference on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science
More powerful and simpler cost-sharing methods
WAOA'04 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Approximation and Online Algorithms
Black-box reductions for cost-sharing mechanism design
Proceedings of the twenty-third annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete Algorithms
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We consider the problem of sharing the cost of scheduling n jobs on m parallel machines among a set of agents. In our setting, each agent owns exactly one job and the cost is given by the makespan of the computed assignment. We focus on @a-budget-balanced cross-monotonic cost-sharing methods since they guarantee the two substantial mechanism properties @a-budget-balance and group-strategyproofness and provide fair cost-shares. For identical jobs on related machines and for arbitrary jobs on identical machines, we give (m+1)/(2m)-budget-balanced cross-monotonic cost-sharing methods and show that this is the best approximation possible. As our major result, we prove that the approximation factor for cross-monotonic cost-sharing methods is unbounded for arbitrary jobs and related machines. We therefore develop a cost-sharing method in the (m+1)/(2m)-core, a weaker but also fair solution concept.