Applications of approximation algorithms to cooperative games
STOC '01 Proceedings of the thirty-third annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Group Strategyproof Mechanisms via Primal-Dual Algorithms
FOCS '03 Proceedings of the 44th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Sharing the cost of multicast transmissions in wireless networks
Proceedings of the sixteenth annual ACM symposium on Parallelism in algorithms and architectures
Sharing the cost of multicast transmissions in wireless networks
Theoretical Computer Science
On the convergence of multicast games in directed networks
Proceedings of the nineteenth annual ACM symposium on Parallel algorithms and architectures
The Power of Small Coalitions in Cost Sharing
WINE '08 Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
Fair cost-sharing methods for scheduling jobs on parallel machines
Journal of Discrete Algorithms
Pseudonyms in Cost-Sharing Games
WINE '09 Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
The price of nash equilibria in multicast transmissions games
ISAAC'07 Proceedings of the 18th international conference on Algorithms and computation
The algorithmic structure of group strategyproof budget-balanced cost-sharing mechanisms
STACS'06 Proceedings of the 23rd Annual conference on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science
Multicast transmissions in non-cooperative networks with a limited number of selfish moves
MFCS'06 Proceedings of the 31st international conference on Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science
Free-riders in steiner tree cost-sharing games
SIROCCO'05 Proceedings of the 12th international conference on Structural Information and Communication Complexity
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We provide a new technique to derive group strategyproof mechanisms for the cost-sharing problem. Our technique is simpler and provably more powerful than the existing one based on so called cross-monotonic cost-sharing methods given by Moulin and Shenker [1997]. Indeed, our method yields the first polynomial-time mechanism for the Steiner tree game which is group strategyproof, budget balance and also meets other standard requirements (No Positive Transfer, Voluntary Participation and Consumer Sovereignty). A known result by Megiddo [1978] implies that this result cannot be achieved with cross-monotonic cost-sharing methods, even if using exponential-time mechanisms.