A nearly best-possible approximation algorithm for node-weighted Steiner trees
Journal of Algorithms
Improved methods for approximating node weighted Steiner trees and connected dominating sets
Information and Computation
Algorithmic mechanism design (extended abstract)
STOC '99 Proceedings of the thirty-first annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Power consumption in packet radio networks
Theoretical Computer Science
Computationally feasible VCG mechanisms
Proceedings of the 2nd ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Applications of approximation algorithms to cooperative games
STOC '01 Proceedings of the thirty-third annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Algorithms, games, and the internet
STOC '01 Proceedings of the thirty-third annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Constructing minimum-energy broadcast trees in wireless ad hoc networks
Proceedings of the 3rd ACM international symposium on Mobile ad hoc networking & computing
Wireless Communications: Principles and Practice
Wireless Communications: Principles and Practice
Sharing the cost of multicast transmissions
Journal of Computer and System Sciences - Special issue on Internet algorithms
Distributed algorithmic mechanism design: recent results and future directions
DIALM '02 Proceedings of the 6th international workshop on Discrete algorithms and methods for mobile computing and communications
Minimum-energy broadcasting in static ad hoc wireless networks
Wireless Networks
New Results for Energy-Efficient Broadcasting in Wireless Networks
ISAAC '02 Proceedings of the 13th International Symposium on Algorithms and Computation
Hardness Results for the Power Range Assignmet Problem in Packet Radio Networks
RANDOM-APPROX '99 Proceedings of the Third International Workshop on Approximation Algorithms for Combinatorial Optimization Problems: Randomization, Approximation, and Combinatorial Algorithms and Techniques
Symmetric Connectivity with Minimum Power Consumption in Radio Networks
TCS '02 Proceedings of the IFIP 17th World Computer Congress - TC1 Stream / 2nd IFIP International Conference on Theoretical Computer Science: Foundations of Information Technology in the Era of Networking and Mobile Computing
Strategyproof cost-sharing mechanisms for set cover and facility location games
Proceedings of the 4th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Approximation and collusion in multicast cost sharing
Proceedings of the 4th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
The minimum broadcast range assignment problem on linear multi-hop wireless networks
Theoretical Computer Science
Truthful Mechanisms for One-Parameter Agents
FOCS '01 Proceedings of the 42nd IEEE symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Hardness results for multicast cost sharing
Theoretical Computer Science
Cooperative facility location games
Journal of Algorithms - Special issue: SODA 2000
Improved approximation results for the minimum energy broadcasting problem
Proceedings of the 2004 joint workshop on Foundations of mobile computing
Tighter Bounds for the Minimum Energy Broadcasting Problem
WIOPT '05 Proceedings of the Third International Symposium on Modeling and Optimization in Mobile, Ad Hoc, and Wireless Networks
ICALP'05 Proceedings of the 32nd international conference on Automata, Languages and Programming
More powerful and simpler cost-sharing methods
WAOA'04 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Approximation and Online Algorithms
When ignorance helps: Graphical multicast cost sharing games
Theoretical Computer Science
On achieving group strategyproof information dissemination in wireless networks
GameNets'09 Proceedings of the First ICST international conference on Game Theory for Networks
| Hi-index | 5.23 |
A crucial issue in non-cooperative wireless networks is that of sharing the cost of multicast transmissions to different users residing at the stations of the network. Each station acts as a selfish agent that may misreport its utility (i.e., the maximum cost it is willing to incur to receive the service, in terms of power consumption) in order to maximize its individual welfare, defined as the difference between its true utility and its charged cost. A provider can discourage such deceptions by using a strategyproof cost sharing mechanism, that is a particular public algorithm that, by forcing the agents to truthfully reveal their utility, starting from the reported utilities, decides who gets the service (the receivers) and at what price. A mechanism is said budget balanced (BB) if the receivers pay exactly the (possibly minimum) cost of the transmission, and β-approximate budget balanced (β-BB) if the total cost charged to the receivers covers the overall cost and is at most β times the optimal one, while it is efficient if it maximizes the sum of the receivers' utilities minus the total cost over all receivers' sets. In this paper, we first investigate cost sharing strategyproof mechanisms for symmetric wireless networks, in which the powers necessary for exchanging messages between stations may be arbitrary and we provide mechanisms that are either efficient or BB when the power assignments are induced by a fixed universal spanning tree, or (3 ln(k + 1))-BB (k is the number of receivers), otherwise. Then we consider the case in which the stations lay in a d-dimensional Euclidean space and the powers fall as 1/dα, and provide strategyproof mechanisms that are either 1-BB or efficient for α = 1 or d = 1. Finally, we show the existence of 2(3d - 1)-BB strategyproof mechanisms in any d-dimensional space for every α ≥ d. For the special case of d = 2 such a result can be improved to achieve 12-BB mechanisms.