A general approximation technique for constrained forest problems
SODA '92 Proceedings of the third annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
When Trees Collide: An Approximation Algorithm for theGeneralized Steiner Problem on Networks
SIAM Journal on Computing
Applications of approximation algorithms to cooperative games
STOC '01 Proceedings of the thirty-third annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Approximation algorithms
Sharing the cost of multicast transmissions
Journal of Computer and System Sciences - Special issue on Internet algorithms
SODA '03 Proceedings of the fourteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Group Strategyproof Mechanisms via Primal-Dual Algorithms
FOCS '03 Proceedings of the 44th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
An algebraic approach to network coding
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
Cross-monotonic cost-sharing methods for connected facility location games
EC '04 Proceedings of the 5th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Limitations of cross-monotonic cost sharing schemes
SODA '05 Proceedings of the sixteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
A group-strategyproof mechanism for Steiner forests
SODA '05 Proceedings of the sixteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Sharing the cost of multicast transmissions in wireless networks
Theoretical Computer Science
Algorithmic Game Theory
Free-riders in steiner tree cost-sharing games
SIROCCO'05 Proceedings of the 12th international conference on Structural Information and Communication Complexity
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory
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We study the dissemination of common information from a source to multiple peers within a multihop wireless network, where peers are equipped with uniform omni-directional antennas and have a fixed cost per packet transmission. While many peers may be interested in the dissemination service, their valuation or utility for such a service is usually private information. A desirable routing and charging mechanism encourages truthful utility reports from the peers. We provide both negative and positive results towards such mechanism design. We show that in order to achieve the group strategyproof property, a compromise in routing optimality or budget-balance is inevitable. In particular, the fraction of optimal routing cost that can be recovered through peer charges cannot be significantly higher than 1/2. To answer the question whether constant-ratio cost recovery is possible, we further apply a primal-dual schema to simultaneously build a routing solution and a cost sharing scheme, and prove that the resulting mechanism is group strategyproof and guarantees 1/8-approximate cost recovery against an optimal routing scheme.