Improved Steiner tree approximation in graphs
SODA '00 Proceedings of the eleventh annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Applications of approximation algorithms to cooperative games
STOC '01 Proceedings of the thirty-third annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Sharing the cost of multicast transmissions
Journal of Computer and System Sciences - Special issue on Internet algorithms
Computers and Intractability: A Guide to the Theory of NP-Completeness
Computers and Intractability: A Guide to the Theory of NP-Completeness
Group Strategyproof Mechanisms via Primal-Dual Algorithms
FOCS '03 Proceedings of the 44th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Cross-monotonic cost-sharing methods for connected facility location games
EC '04 Proceedings of the 5th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Sharing the cost of multicast transmissions in wireless networks
Proceedings of the sixteenth annual ACM symposium on Parallelism in algorithms and architectures
Improved approximation results for the minimum energy broadcasting problem
Proceedings of the 2004 joint workshop on Foundations of mobile computing
Limitations of cross-monotonic cost sharing schemes
SODA '05 Proceedings of the sixteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
A group-strategyproof mechanism for Steiner forests
SODA '05 Proceedings of the sixteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
More powerful and simpler cost-sharing methods
WAOA'04 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Approximation and Online Algorithms
On the convergence of multicast games in directed networks
Proceedings of the nineteenth annual ACM symposium on Parallel algorithms and architectures
On achieving group strategyproof information dissemination in wireless networks
GameNets'09 Proceedings of the First ICST international conference on Game Theory for Networks
The price of nash equilibria in multicast transmissions games
ISAAC'07 Proceedings of the 18th international conference on Algorithms and computation
The algorithmic structure of group strategyproof budget-balanced cost-sharing mechanisms
STACS'06 Proceedings of the 23rd Annual conference on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science
Multicast transmissions in non-cooperative networks with a limited number of selfish moves
MFCS'06 Proceedings of the 31st international conference on Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science
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We consider cost-sharing mechanisms for the Steiner tree game. In this well-studied cooperative game, each selfish user expresses his/her willingness to pay for being connected to a source node s in an underlying graph. A mechanism decides which users will be connected and divides the cost of the corresponding (optimal) Steiner tree among these users (budget balance condition). Since users can form coalitions and misreport their willingness to pay, the mechanism must be group strategyproof: even coalitions of users cannot benefit from lying to the mechanism. We present new polynomial-time mechanisms which satisfy a standard set of axioms considered in the literature (i.e., budget balance, group strategyproofness, voluntary participation, consumer sovereignty, no positive transfer, cost optimality) and consider the free riders issue recently raised by Immorlica et al. [SODA 2005]: it would be desirable to avoid users that are connected for free. We also provide a number of negative results on the existence of polynomial-time mechanisms with certain guarantee on the number of free riders. Finally, we extend our technique and results to a variant considered by Biló et al. [SPAA 2004] with applications to wireless multicast cost sharing.