Applications of approximation algorithms to cooperative games
STOC '01 Proceedings of the thirty-third annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Group Strategyproof Mechanisms via Primal-Dual Algorithms
FOCS '03 Proceedings of the 44th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Cross-monotonic cost-sharing methods for connected facility location games
EC '04 Proceedings of the 5th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Sharing the cost of multicast transmissions in wireless networks
Proceedings of the sixteenth annual ACM symposium on Parallelism in algorithms and architectures
Limitations of cross-monotonic cost sharing schemes
SODA '05 Proceedings of the sixteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
A group-strategyproof mechanism for Steiner forests
SODA '05 Proceedings of the sixteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Cost sharing and strategyproof mechanisms for set cover games
STACS'05 Proceedings of the 22nd annual conference on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science
More powerful and simpler cost-sharing methods
WAOA'04 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Approximation and Online Algorithms
Free-riders in steiner tree cost-sharing games
SIROCCO'05 Proceedings of the 12th international conference on Structural Information and Communication Complexity
The Power of Small Coalitions in Cost Sharing
WINE '08 Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
Fair cost-sharing methods for scheduling jobs on parallel machines
Journal of Discrete Algorithms
Pseudonyms in Cost-Sharing Games
WINE '09 Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
WINE'07 Proceedings of the 3rd international conference on Internet and network economics
Cost sharing and strategyproof mechanisms for set cover games
Journal of Combinatorial Optimization
A complete characterization of group-strategyproof mechanisms of cost-sharing
ESA'10 Proceedings of the 18th annual European conference on Algorithms: Part I
Fair cost-sharing methods for scheduling jobs on parallel machines
CIAC'06 Proceedings of the 6th Italian conference on Algorithms and Complexity
The power of two prices: beyond cross-monotonicity
MFCS'07 Proceedings of the 32nd international conference on Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science
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We study mechanisms for cooperative cost-sharing games satisfying: voluntary participation (i.e., no user is forced to pay more her valuation of the service), consumer sovereignty (i.e, every user can get the service if her valuation is large enough), no positive transfer (i.e., no user receives money from the mechanism), budget balance (i.e., the total amount of money that users pay is equal to the cost of servicing them), and group strategyproofness (i.e., the mechanism is resistant to coalitions). We show that mechanisms satisfying all these requirements must obey certain algorithmic properties (which basically specify how the serviced users are selected). Our results yield a characterization of upper continuous mechanisms (this class is interesting as all known general techniques yield mechanisms of this type). Finally, we extend some of our negative results and obtain the first negative results on the existence of mechanisms satisfying all requirements above. We apply these results to an interesting generalization of cost-sharing games in which the mechanism cannot service certain “forbidden” subsets of users. These generalized cost-sharing games correspond to natural variants of known cost-sharing games and have interesting practical applications (e.g., sharing the cost of multicast transmissions which cannot be encrypted).