Cross-monotonic cost-sharing methods for connected facility location games
EC '04 Proceedings of the 5th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Sharing the cost more efficiently: improved approximation for multicommodity rent-or-buy
SODA '05 Proceedings of the sixteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Limitations of cross-monotonic cost sharing schemes
SODA '05 Proceedings of the sixteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
A group-strategyproof mechanism for Steiner forests
SODA '05 Proceedings of the sixteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
An efficient cost-sharing mechanism for the prize-collecting Steiner forest problem
SODA '07 Proceedings of the eighteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Cost sharing methods for makespan and completion time scheduling
STACS'07 Proceedings of the 24th annual conference on Theoretical aspects of computer science
The algorithmic structure of group strategyproof budget-balanced cost-sharing mechanisms
STACS'06 Proceedings of the 23rd Annual conference on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science
From primal-dual to cost shares and back: a stronger LP relaxation for the steiner forest problem
ICALP'05 Proceedings of the 32nd international conference on Automata, Languages and Programming
Fair cost-sharing methods for scheduling jobs on parallel machines
CIAC'06 Proceedings of the 6th Italian conference on Algorithms and Complexity
The Power of Small Coalitions in Cost Sharing
WINE '08 Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
Pseudonyms in Cost-Sharing Games
WINE '09 Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
WINE'07 Proceedings of the 3rd international conference on Internet and network economics
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Assuming strict consumer sovereignty (CS*), when can costsharing mechanisms simultaneously be group-strategyproof (GSP) and β-budget-balanced (ß-BB)? Moulin mechanisms are GSP and 1-BB for submodular costs. We overcome the submodularity requirement and instead consider arbitrary--yet symmetric--costs: - Already for 4 players, we show that symmetry of costs is not sufficient for the existence of a GSP and 1-BB mechanism. However, for only 3 players, we give a GSP and 1-BB mechanism. - We introduce two-price cost-sharing forms (2P-CSFs) that define players' cost shares and present a novel mechanism that is GSP given any such 2P-CSF. For subadditive costs, we give an algorithm to compute 2P-CSFs that are √17+1/4 -BB (≈ 1.28). This result is then shown to be tight for 2P-CSFs. Yet, this is a significant improvement over 2-BB, which is the best Moulin mechanisms can achieve. We give applications to the minimum makespan scheduling problem. A key feature of all our mechanisms is a preference order on the set of players. Higher cost shares are always payed by least preferred players.