When Trees Collide: An Approximation Algorithm for theGeneralized Steiner Problem on Networks
SIAM Journal on Computing
A General Approximation Technique for Constrained Forest Problems
SIAM Journal on Computing
Approximation algorithms for facility location problems (extended abstract)
STOC '97 Proceedings of the twenty-ninth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
A threshold of ln n for approximating set cover
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Greedy strikes back: improved facility location algorithms
Journal of Algorithms
Applications of approximation algorithms to cooperative games
STOC '01 Proceedings of the thirty-third annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Approximation algorithms
Equitable cost allocations via primal-dual-type algorithms
STOC '02 Proceedings of the thiry-fourth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Iterative Combinatorial Auctions: Theory and Practice
Proceedings of the Seventeenth National Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Twelfth Conference on Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence
Hardness results for multicast cost sharing
Theoretical Computer Science
FOCS '03 Proceedings of the 44th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Group Strategyproof Mechanisms via Primal-Dual Algorithms
FOCS '03 Proceedings of the 44th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Greedy facility location algorithms analyzed using dual fitting with factor-revealing LP
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Improved Approximation Algorithms for the Uncapacitated Facility Location Problem
SIAM Journal on Computing
Cross-monotonic cost sharing methods for connected facility location games
Theoretical Computer Science
Strategyproof cost-sharing mechanisms for set cover and facility location games
Decision Support Systems - Special issue: The fourth ACM conference on electronic commerce
Limitations of cross-monotonic cost sharing schemes
SODA '05 Proceedings of the sixteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
A group-strategyproof mechanism for Steiner forests
SODA '05 Proceedings of the sixteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
New trade-offs in cost-sharing mechanisms
Proceedings of the thirty-eighth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
An efficient cost-sharing mechanism for the prize-collecting Steiner forest problem
SODA '07 Proceedings of the eighteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Optimal Efficiency Guarantees for Network Design Mechanisms
IPCO '07 Proceedings of the 12th international conference on Integer Programming and Combinatorial Optimization
Group-strategyproof cost sharing mechanisms for makespan and other scheduling problems
Theoretical Computer Science
Singleton Acyclic Mechanisms and Their Applications to Scheduling Problems
SAGT '08 Proceedings of the 1st International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory
Is Shapley Cost Sharing Optimal?
SAGT '08 Proceedings of the 1st International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory
Group-Strategyproof Cost Sharing for Metric Fault Tolerant Facility Location
SAGT '08 Proceedings of the 1st International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory
The Power of Small Coalitions in Cost Sharing
WINE '08 Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
Pseudonyms in Cost-Sharing Games
WINE '09 Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
WINE'07 Proceedings of the 3rd international conference on Internet and network economics
A complete characterization of group-strategyproof mechanisms of cost-sharing
ESA'10 Proceedings of the 18th annual European conference on Algorithms: Part I
Online cooperative cost sharing
CIAC'10 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Algorithms and Complexity
The power of two prices: beyond cross-monotonicity
MFCS'07 Proceedings of the 32nd international conference on Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science
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The only known general technique for designing truthful, approximatelybudget-balanced cost-sharing mechanisms is due to Moulin. While Moulin mechanisms have been successfully designed for a widerange of applications, recent negative results show that for manyfundamental cost-sharing problems, Moulin mechanisms inevitably sufferfrom poor budget-balance, poor economic efficiency, or both. We propose acyclic mechanisms, a new framework for designingtruthful, approximately budget-balanced cost-sharing mechanisms. Acyclic mechanisms strictly generalize Moulin mechanisms andoffer three important advantages. First, it is easier to design acyclic mechanisms than Moulinmechanisms: many classical primal-dual algorithms naturallyinduce a non-Moulin acyclic mechanism with good performanceguarantees. Second, for several important classes of cost-sharing problems, acyclicmechanisms have exponentially better budget-balance and economicefficiency than Moulin mechanisms.Finally, while Moulin mechanisms have found application primarily in binary demand games, we extend acyclic mechanisms to general demand games, a multi-parameter setting in which each bidder can be allocated one of several levels of service.