Worst case bound of an LRF schedule for the mean weighted flow-time problem
SIAM Journal on Computing
Minimizing mean flow time with release time constraint
Theoretical Computer Science
Scheduling Algorithms
Strategyproof cost-sharing mechanisms for set cover and facility location games
Proceedings of the 4th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Limitations of cross-monotonic cost sharing schemes
SODA '05 Proceedings of the sixteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
A group-strategyproof mechanism for Steiner forests
SODA '05 Proceedings of the sixteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
New trade-offs in cost-sharing mechanisms
Proceedings of the thirty-eighth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
An efficient cost-sharing mechanism for the prize-collecting Steiner forest problem
SODA '07 Proceedings of the eighteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Optimal Efficiency Guarantees for Network Design Mechanisms
IPCO '07 Proceedings of the 12th international conference on Integer Programming and Combinatorial Optimization
Cost sharing methods for makespan and completion time scheduling
STACS'07 Proceedings of the 24th annual conference on Theoretical aspects of computer science
Optimal cost-sharing mechanisms for steiner forest problems
WINE'06 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Internet and Network Economics
From primal-dual to cost shares and back: a stronger LP relaxation for the steiner forest problem
ICALP'05 Proceedings of the 32nd international conference on Automata, Languages and Programming
Fair cost-sharing methods for scheduling jobs on parallel machines
CIAC'06 Proceedings of the 6th Italian conference on Algorithms and Complexity
The Power of Small Coalitions in Cost Sharing
WINE '08 Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
Black-box reductions for cost-sharing mechanism design
Proceedings of the twenty-third annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete Algorithms
Online cooperative cost sharing
CIAC'10 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Algorithms and Complexity
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Mehta, Roughgarden, and Sundararajan recently introduced a new class of cost sharing mechanisms called acyclic mechanisms. These mechanisms achieve a slightly weaker notion of truthfulness than the well-known Moulin mechanisms, but provide additional freedom to improve budget balance and social cost approximation guarantees. In this paper, we investigate the potential of acyclic mechanisms for combinatorial optimization problems. In particular, we study a subclass of acyclic mechanisms which we term singleton acyclic mechanisms. We show that every ρ-approximate algorithm that is partially increasingcan be turned into a singleton acyclic mechanism that is weakly group-strategyproof and ρ-budget balanced. Based on this result, we develop singleton acyclic mechanisms for parallel machine scheduling problems with completion time objectives, which perform extremely well both with respect to budget balance and social cost.