A note on the prize collecting traveling salesman problem
Mathematical Programming: Series A and B
Applications of approximation algorithms to cooperative games
STOC '01 Proceedings of the thirty-third annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Approximation algorithms
Equitable cost allocations via primal-dual-type algorithms
STOC '02 Proceedings of the thiry-fourth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Sharing the cost of multicast transmissions
Journal of Computer and System Sciences - Special issue on Internet algorithms
Distributed algorithmic mechanism design: recent results and future directions
DIALM '02 Proceedings of the 6th international workshop on Discrete algorithms and methods for mobile computing and communications
Strategyproof cost-sharing mechanisms for set cover and facility location games
Proceedings of the 4th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Simpler and better approximation algorithms for network design
Proceedings of the thirty-fifth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Building Steiner trees with incomplete global knowledge
FOCS '00 Proceedings of the 41st Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Hardness results for multicast cost sharing
Theoretical Computer Science
FOCS '03 Proceedings of the 44th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Group Strategyproof Mechanisms via Primal-Dual Algorithms
FOCS '03 Proceedings of the 44th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Optimization in the private value model: competitive analysis applied to auction design
Optimization in the private value model: competitive analysis applied to auction design
Cross-monotonic cost-sharing methods for connected facility location games
EC '04 Proceedings of the 5th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Sharing the cost more efficiently: improved approximation for multicommodity rent-or-buy
SODA '05 Proceedings of the sixteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Limitations of cross-monotonic cost sharing schemes
SODA '05 Proceedings of the sixteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
A group-strategyproof mechanism for Steiner forests
SODA '05 Proceedings of the sixteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
New trade-offs in cost-sharing mechanisms
Proceedings of the thirty-eighth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Simple cost sharing schemes for multicommodity rent-or-buy and stochastic Steiner tree
Proceedings of the thirty-eighth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
An efficient cost-sharing mechanism for the prize-collecting Steiner forest problem
SODA '07 Proceedings of the eighteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Optimal cost-sharing mechanisms for steiner forest problems
WINE'06 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Internet and Network Economics
Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Group-strategyproof cost sharing mechanisms for makespan and other scheduling problems
Theoretical Computer Science
Singleton Acyclic Mechanisms and Their Applications to Scheduling Problems
SAGT '08 Proceedings of the 1st International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory
Group-Strategyproof Cost Sharing for Metric Fault Tolerant Facility Location
SAGT '08 Proceedings of the 1st International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory
Correlation robust stochastic optimization
SODA '10 Proceedings of the twenty-first annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete Algorithms
Black-box reductions for cost-sharing mechanism design
Proceedings of the twenty-third annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete Algorithms
Cost-recovering bayesian algorithmic mechanism design
Proceedings of the fourteenth ACM conference on Electronic commerce
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A cost-sharing problem is defined by a set of players vying to receive some good or service, and a cost function describing the cost incurred by the auctioneer as a function of the set of winners. A cost-sharing mechanism is a protocol that decides which players win the auction and at what prices. Three desirable but provably mutually incompatible properties of a cost-sharing mechanism are: incentive-compatibility, meaning that players are motivated to bid their true private value for receiving the good; budget-balance, meaning that the mechanism recovers its incurred cost with the prices charged; and efficiency, meaning that the cost incurred and the value to the players served are traded off in an optimal way.Our work is motivated by the following fundamental question: for which cost-sharing problems are incentive-compatible mechanisms with good approximate budget-balance and efficiency possible? We focus on cost functions defined implicitly by NP-hard combinatorial optimization problems, including the metric uncapacitated facility location problem, the Steiner tree problem, and rent-or-buy network design problems. For facility location and rent-or-buy network design, we establish for the first time that approximate budget-balance and efficiency are simultaneously possible. For the Steiner tree problem, where such a guarantee was previously known, we prove a new, optimal lower bound on the approximate efficiency achievable by the wide and natural class of "Moulin mechanisms". This lower bound exposes a latent approximation hierarchy among different cost-sharing problems.