Optimal cost-sharing mechanisms for steiner forest problems

  • Authors:
  • Shuchi Chawla;Tim Roughgarden;Mukund Sundararajan

  • Affiliations:
  • Department of Computer Science, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Madison, WI;Department of Computer Science, Stanford University, Stanford, CA;Department of Computer Science, Stanford University, Stanford, CA

  • Venue:
  • WINE'06 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Internet and Network Economics
  • Year:
  • 2006

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Abstract

Könemann, Leonardi, and Schäfer [14] gave a 2-budget-balanced and groupstrategyproof mechanism for Steiner forest cost-sharing problems. We prove that this mechanism also achieves an O(log2k)-approximation of the social cost, where k is the number of players. As a consequence, the KLS mechanism has the smallest-possible worst-case efficiency loss, up to constant factors, among all O(1)-budget-balanced Moulin mechanisms for such cost functions. We also extend our results to a more general network design problem.