Data networks
The egalitarian solution and reduced game properties in convex games
International Journal of Game Theory
Convergence complexity of optimistic rate based flow control algorithms (extended abstract)
STOC '96 Proceedings of the twenty-eighth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
A combinatorial algorithm minimizing submodular functions in strongly polynomial time
Journal of Combinatorial Theory Series B
Approximate majorization and fair online load balancing
SODA '01 Proceedings of the twelfth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Applications of approximation algorithms to cooperative games
STOC '01 Proceedings of the thirty-third annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Approximation algorithms
A combinatorial strongly polynomial algorithm for minimizing submodular functions
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Fairness in Routing and Load Balancing
FOCS '99 Proceedings of the 40th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Strategyproof cost-sharing mechanisms for set cover and facility location games
Proceedings of the 4th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Boosted sampling: approximation algorithms for stochastic optimization
STOC '04 Proceedings of the thirty-sixth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Approximation techniques for utilitarian mechanism design
Proceedings of the thirty-seventh annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Strategyproof cost-sharing mechanisms for set cover and facility location games
Decision Support Systems - Special issue: The fourth ACM conference on electronic commerce
Cost sharing in a job scheduling problem using the Shapley value
Proceedings of the 6th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Limitations of cross-monotonic cost sharing schemes
SODA '05 Proceedings of the sixteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
The prize-collecting generalized steiner tree problem via a new approach of primal-dual schema
SODA '06 Proceedings of the seventeenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithm
New trade-offs in cost-sharing mechanisms
Proceedings of the thirty-eighth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Approximation via cost sharing: Simpler and better approximation algorithms for network design
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Eisenberg-Gale markets: algorithms and structural properties
Proceedings of the thirty-ninth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Limitations of cross-monotonic cost-sharing schemes
ACM Transactions on Algorithms (TALG)
Infrastructure Leasing Problems
IPCO '07 Proceedings of the 12th international conference on Integer Programming and Combinatorial Optimization
Optimal Efficiency Guarantees for Network Design Mechanisms
IPCO '07 Proceedings of the 12th international conference on Integer Programming and Combinatorial Optimization
Efficiency, Fairness and Competitiveness in Nash Bargaining Games
WINE '08 Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
New geometry-inspired relaxations and algorithms for the metric steiner tree problem
IPCO'08 Proceedings of the 13th international conference on Integer programming and combinatorial optimization
Optimal cost-sharing mechanisms for steiner forest problems
WINE'06 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Internet and Network Economics
Approximation Techniques for Utilitarian Mechanism Design
SIAM Journal on Computing
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Perhaps the strongest notion of truth-revealing in a cost sharing method is group strategyproofness. However, matters are not so clear-cut on fairness, and many different, sometimes even conflicting, notions of fairness have been proposed which have relevance in different situations. We present a large class of group strategyproof cost sharing methods, for submodular cost functions, satisfying a wide range of fairness criteria, thereby allowing the service provider to choose a method that best satisfies the notion of fairness that is most relevant to her application. Our class includes the Dutta-Ray egalitarian method as a special case. It also includes a new cost sharing method, which we call the opportunity egalitarian method.