Efficiency, Fairness and Competitiveness in Nash Bargaining Games

Authors:
Deeparnab Chakrabarty;Gagan Goel;Vijay V. Vazirani;Lei Wang;Changyuan Yu
Affiliations:
Department of Combinatorics and Optimization, University of Waterloo, Waterloo,;College of Computing, Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta GA 30332---0280;College of Computing, Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta GA 30332---0280;College of Computing, Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta GA 30332---0280;Institute for Theoretical Computer Science, Tsinghua University, Beijing, China
Venue:
WINE '08 Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
Year:
2008

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Abstract

Recently, [8] defined the class of Linear Nash Bargaining Games (LNB) and obtained combinatorial, polynomial time algorithms for several games in this class. [8] also defines two natural subclasses within LNB, UNB and SNB, which contain a number of natural Nash bargaining games. In this paper we define three basic game theoretic properties of Nash bargaining games: price of bargaining, fairness and full competitiveness. We show that for each of these properties, a game in UNB has this property iff it is in SNB.