Strategyproof cost-sharing mechanisms for set cover and facility location games

Authors:
Nikhil R. Devanur;Milena Mihail;Vijay V. Vazirani
Affiliations:
College of Computing, Georgia Institute of Technology 801, Atlantic Dr., Atlanta, GA;College of Computing, Georgia Institute of Technology 801, Atlantic Dr., Atlanta, GA;College of Computing, Georgia Institute of Technology 801, Atlantic Dr., Atlanta, GA
Venue:
Decision Support Systems - Special issue: The fourth ACM conference on electronic commerce
Year:
2005

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Abstract

Strategyproof cost-sharing mechanisms, lying in the core, that recover 1/α fraction of the cost, are presented for the set cover and facility location games: α=O(log n) for the former and 1:861 for the latter. Our mechanisms utilize approximation algorithms for these problems based on the method of dual-fitting.