A note on the prize collecting traveling salesman problem
Mathematical Programming: Series A and B
Approximation algorithms for NP-hard problems
Online computation and competitive analysis
Online computation and competitive analysis
Applications of approximation algorithms to cooperative games
STOC '01 Proceedings of the thirty-third annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Sharing the cost of multicast transmissions
Journal of Computer and System Sciences - Special issue on Internet algorithms
Distributed algorithmic mechanism design: recent results and future directions
DIALM '02 Proceedings of the 6th international workshop on Discrete algorithms and methods for mobile computing and communications
The complexity of theorem-proving procedures
STOC '71 Proceedings of the third annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Hardness results for multicast cost sharing
Theoretical Computer Science
Group Strategyproof Mechanisms via Primal-Dual Algorithms
FOCS '03 Proceedings of the 44th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Optimization in the private value model: competitive analysis applied to auction design
Optimization in the private value model: competitive analysis applied to auction design
Cross-monotonic cost sharing methods for connected facility location games
Theoretical Computer Science
Strategyproof cost-sharing mechanisms for set cover and facility location games
Decision Support Systems - Special issue: The fourth ACM conference on electronic commerce
New trade-offs in cost-sharing mechanisms
Proceedings of the thirty-eighth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Data streams: algorithms and applications
Foundations and Trends® in Theoretical Computer Science
An efficient cost-sharing mechanism for the prize-collecting Steiner forest problem
SODA '07 Proceedings of the eighteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Cost-Sharing Mechanisms for Network Design
Algorithmica
A Group-Strategyproof Cost Sharing Mechanism for the Steiner Forest Game
SIAM Journal on Computing
Limitations of cross-monotonic cost-sharing schemes
ACM Transactions on Algorithms (TALG)
Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - Volume 2
Equitable Cost Allocations via Primal-Dual-Type Algorithms
SIAM Journal on Computing
Cost sharing methods for makespan and completion time scheduling
STACS'07 Proceedings of the 24th annual conference on Theoretical aspects of computer science
Optimal cost-sharing mechanisms for steiner forest problems
WINE'06 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Internet and Network Economics
Fair cost-sharing methods for scheduling jobs on parallel machines
CIAC'06 Proceedings of the 6th Italian conference on Algorithms and Complexity
Black-box reductions for cost-sharing mechanism design
Proceedings of the twenty-third annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete Algorithms
Minimizing rosenthal potential in multicast games
ICALP'12 Proceedings of the 39th international colloquium conference on Automata, Languages, and Programming - Volume Part II
Cost-recovering bayesian algorithmic mechanism design
Proceedings of the fourteenth ACM conference on Electronic commerce
| Hi-index | 0.00 |
In a cost-sharing problem, several participants with unknown preferences vie to receive some good or service, and each possible outcome has a known cost. A cost-sharing mechanism is a protocol that decides which participants are allocated a good and at what prices. Three desirable properties of a cost-sharing mechanism are: incentive-compatibility, meaning that participants are motivated to bid their true private value for receiving the good; budget-balance, meaning that the mechanism recovers its incurred cost with the prices charged; and economic efficiency, meaning that the cost incurred and the value to the participants are traded off in an optimal way. These three goals have been known to be mutually incompatible for thirty years. Nearly all the work on cost-sharing mechanism design by the economics and computer science communities has focused on achieving two of these goals while completely ignoring the third. We introduce novel measures for quantifying efficiency loss in cost-sharing mechanisms and prove simultaneous approximate budget-balance and approximate efficiency guarantees for mechanisms for a wide range of cost-sharing problems, including all submodular and Steiner tree problems. Our key technical tool is an exact characterization of worst-case efficiency loss in Moulin mechanisms, the dominant paradigm in cost-sharing mechanism design.