Applications of approximation algorithms to cooperative games
STOC '01 Proceedings of the thirty-third annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Approximation algorithms
Primal-Dual Algorithms for Connected Facility Location Problems
APPROX '02 Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Approximation Algorithms for Combinatorial Optimization
Strategyproof cost-sharing mechanisms for set cover and facility location games
Proceedings of the 4th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Simpler and better approximation algorithms for network design
Proceedings of the thirty-fifth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Group Strategyproof Mechanisms via Primal-Dual Algorithms
FOCS '03 Proceedings of the 44th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
An efficient cost-sharing mechanism for the prize-collecting Steiner forest problem
SODA '07 Proceedings of the eighteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Group-strategyproof cost sharing mechanisms for makespan and other scheduling problems
Theoretical Computer Science
Infrastructure Leasing Problems
IPCO '07 Proceedings of the 12th international conference on Integer Programming and Combinatorial Optimization
Quantifying inefficiency in cost-sharing mechanisms
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Cost sharing methods for makespan and completion time scheduling
STACS'07 Proceedings of the 24th annual conference on Theoretical aspects of computer science
Pricing tree access networks with connected backbones
ESA'07 Proceedings of the 15th annual European conference on Algorithms
Black-box reductions for cost-sharing mechanism design
Proceedings of the twenty-third annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete Algorithms
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We present cost sharing methods for connected facility location games that are cross-monotonic and competitive and that recover a constant fraction of the cost of the constructed solution. The novelty of this paper is that we use randomized algorithms and that we share the expected cost among the participating users. As a consequence, our cost sharing methods are simple and achieve attractive approximation ratios. We also provide a primal-dual cost sharing method for the connected facility location game with opening costs.