Pricing in computer networks: reshaping the research agenda
ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review
Sharing the “cost” of multicast trees: an axiomatic analysis
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
Improved performance of the greedy algorithm for partial cover
Information Processing Letters
A threshold of ln n for approximating set cover
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Sharing the cost of multicast transmissions
Journal of Computer and System Sciences - Special issue on Internet algorithms
Truth revelation in approximately efficient combinatorial auctions
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Strategyproof cost-sharing mechanisms for set cover and facility location games
Proceedings of the 4th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Hardness results for multicast cost sharing
Theoretical Computer Science
Group Strategyproof Mechanisms via Primal-Dual Algorithms
FOCS '03 Proceedings of the 44th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Priority service and max-min fairness
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
Limitations of cross-monotonic cost sharing schemes
SODA '05 Proceedings of the sixteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Cost sharing and strategyproof mechanisms for set cover games
Journal of Combinatorial Optimization
Mechanism design for set cover games with selfish element agents
Theoretical Computer Science
Collaboration and shared plans in the open world: studies of ridesharing
IJCAI'09 Proceedings of the 21st international jont conference on Artifical intelligence
Non-cooperative facility location and covering games
Theoretical Computer Science
Competitive cost sharing with economies of scale
LATIN'08 Proceedings of the 8th Latin American conference on Theoretical informatics
Cost sharing and strategyproof mechanisms for set cover games
Journal of Combinatorial Optimization
Selfish service installation in networks
WINE'06 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Internet and Network Economics
The algorithmic structure of group strategyproof budget-balanced cost-sharing mechanisms
STACS'06 Proceedings of the 23rd Annual conference on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science
Complexity of majority monopoly and signed domination problems
Journal of Discrete Algorithms
Mechanism design for set cover games when elements are agents
AAIM'05 Proceedings of the First international conference on Algorithmic Applications in Management
Non-cooperative facility location and covering games
ISAAC'06 Proceedings of the 17th international conference on Algorithms and Computation
LP-Based covering games with low price of anarchy
WINE'12 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Internet and Network Economics
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We develop for set cover games several general cost-sharing methods that are approximately budget-balanced, core, and/or group-strategyproof. We first study the cost sharing for a single set cover game, which does not have a budget-balanced core. We show that there is no cost allocation method that can always recover more than $\frac{1}{ln n}$ of the total cost if we require the cost sharing being a core. Here n is the number of all players to be served. We give an efficient cost allocation method that always recovers $\frac{1}{ln d_max}$ of the total cost, where dmax is the maximum size of all sets. We then study the cost allocation scheme for all induced subgames. It is known that no cost sharing scheme can always recover more than $\frac{1}{n}$ of the total cost for every subset of players. We give an efficient cost sharing scheme that always recovers at least $\frac{1}{2n}$ of the total cost for every subset of players and furthermore, our scheme is cross-monotone. When the elements to be covered are selfish agents with privately known valuations, we present a strategyproof charging mechanism, under the assumption that all sets are simple sets, such that each element maximizes its profit when it reports its valuation truthfully; further, the total cost of the set cover is no more than ln dmax times that of an optimal solution. When the sets are selfish agents with privately known costs, we present a strategyproof payment mechanism in which each set maximizes its profit when it reports its cost truthfully. We also show how to fairly share the payments to all sets among the elements.