Computationally feasible VCG mechanisms
Proceedings of the 2nd ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Truth revelation in approximately efficient combinatorial auctions
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
An approximate truthful mechanism for combinatorial auctions with single parameter agents
SODA '03 Proceedings of the fourteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Strategyproof cost-sharing mechanisms for set cover and facility location games
Proceedings of the 4th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Hardness results for multicast cost sharing
Theoretical Computer Science
The Price of Stability for Network Design with Fair Cost Allocation
FOCS '04 Proceedings of the 45th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Towards truthful mechanisms for binary demand games: a general framework
Proceedings of the 6th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Limitations of cross-monotonic cost sharing schemes
SODA '05 Proceedings of the sixteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
New trade-offs in cost-sharing mechanisms
Proceedings of the thirty-eighth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
STACS'99 Proceedings of the 16th annual conference on Theoretical aspects of computer science
Mechanism design for set cover games when elements are agents
AAIM'05 Proceedings of the First international conference on Algorithmic Applications in Management
Cost sharing and strategyproof mechanisms for set cover games
STACS'05 Proceedings of the 22nd annual conference on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science
Non-cooperative facility location and covering games
Theoretical Computer Science
LP-Based covering games with low price of anarchy
WINE'12 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Internet and Network Economics
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In this article, we study the set cover games when the elements are selfish agents, each of which has a privately known valuation of receiving the service from the sets, i.e., being covered by some set. Each set is assumed to have a fixed cost. We develop several approximately efficient strategyproof mechanisms that decide, after soliciting the declared bids by all elements, which elements will be covered, which sets will provide the coverage to these selected elements, and how much each element will be charged. For single-cover set cover games, we present a mechanism that is at least 1d"m"a"x-efficient, i.e., the total valuation of all selected elements is at least 1d"m"a"x fraction of the total valuation produced by any mechanism. Here, d"m"a"x is the maximum size of the sets. For multi-cover set cover games, we present a budget-balanced strategyproof mechanism that is 1d"m"a"xH"d"""m"""a"""x-efficient under reasonable assumptions. Here, H"n is the harmonic function. For the set cover games when both sets and elements are selfish agents, we show that a cross-monotonic payment-sharing scheme does not necessarily induce a strategyproof mechanism.