Approximation algorithms for NP-complete problems on planar graphs
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Applications of approximation algorithms to cooperative games
STOC '01 Proceedings of the thirty-third annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Algorithms, games, and the internet
STOC '01 Proceedings of the thirty-third annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Strategyproof cost-sharing mechanisms for set cover and facility location games
Proceedings of the 4th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Near-optimal network design with selfish agents
Proceedings of the thirty-fifth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Proceedings of the twenty-second annual symposium on Principles of distributed computing
Equilibria in topology control games for ad hoc networks
DIALM-POMC '03 Proceedings of the 2003 joint workshop on Foundations of mobile computing
Proceedings of the twenty-third annual ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing
The Price of Stability for Network Design with Fair Cost Allocation
FOCS '04 Proceedings of the 45th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
The Price of Routing Unsplittable Flow
Proceedings of the thirty-seventh annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Limitations of cross-monotonic cost sharing schemes
SODA '05 Proceedings of the sixteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
STACS'99 Proceedings of the 16th annual conference on Theoretical aspects of computer science
On the price of anarchy and stability of correlated equilibria of linear congestion games,,
ESA'05 Proceedings of the 13th annual European conference on Algorithms
Geometric network design with selfish agents
COCOON'05 Proceedings of the 11th annual international conference on Computing and Combinatorics
Mechanism design for set cover games when elements are agents
AAIM'05 Proceedings of the First international conference on Algorithmic Applications in Management
Cost sharing and strategyproof mechanisms for set cover games
STACS'05 Proceedings of the 22nd annual conference on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science
A service location problem with QoS constraints
IWCMC '07 Proceedings of the 2007 international conference on Wireless communications and mobile computing
Non-cooperative facility location and covering games
Theoretical Computer Science
Competitive cost sharing with economies of scale
LATIN'08 Proceedings of the 8th Latin American conference on Theoretical informatics
Non-cooperative facility location and covering games
ISAAC'06 Proceedings of the 17th international conference on Algorithms and Computation
LP-Based covering games with low price of anarchy
WINE'12 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Internet and Network Economics
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We consider a scenario of distributed service installation in privately owned networks. Our model is a non-cooperative vertex cover game for k players. Each player owns a set of edges in a graph G and strives to cover each edge by an incident vertex. Vertices have costs and must be purchased to be available for the cover. Vertex costs can be shared arbitrarily by players. Once a vertex is bought, it can be used by any player to fulfill the covering requirement of her incident edges. Despite its simplicity, the model exhibits a surprisingly rich set of properties. We present a cumulative set of results including tight characterizations for prices of anarchy and stability, NP-hardness of equilibrium existence, and polynomial time solvability for important subclasses of the game. In addition, we consider the task of finding approximate Nash equilibria purchasing an approximation to the optimum social cost, in which each player can improve her contribution by selfish defection only by at most a certain factor. A variation of the primal-dual algorithm for minimum weighted vertex cover yields a guarantee of 2, which is shown to be tight.