A General Approximation Technique for Constrained Forest Problems
SIAM Journal on Computing
Computational geometry: algorithms and applications
Computational geometry: algorithms and applications
Polynomial time approximation schemes for Euclidean traveling salesman and other geometric problems
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Improved Steiner tree approximation in graphs
SODA '00 Proceedings of the eleventh annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Selfish traffic allocation for server farms
STOC '02 Proceedings of the thiry-fourth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Approximation Hardness of the Steiner Tree Problem on Graphs
SWAT '02 Proceedings of the 8th Scandinavian Workshop on Algorithm Theory
Near-optimal network design with selfish agents
Proceedings of the thirty-fifth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Proceedings of the twenty-second annual symposium on Principles of distributed computing
The Price of Stability for Network Design with Fair Cost Allocation
FOCS '04 Proceedings of the 45th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Selfish Routing in Capacitated Networks
Mathematics of Operations Research
STACS'99 Proceedings of the 16th annual conference on Theoretical aspects of computer science
Price of Stability in Survivable Network Design
SAGT '09 Proceedings of the 2nd International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory
Non-cooperative facility location and covering games
Theoretical Computer Science
Strategic multiway cut and multicut games
WAOA'10 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Approximation and online algorithms
Selfish service installation in networks
WINE'06 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Internet and Network Economics
MFCS'06 Proceedings of the 31st international conference on Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science
Hi-index | 0.00 |
We study a geometric version of a simple non-cooperative network creation game introduced in [2], assuming Euclidean edge costs on the plane. The price of anarchy in such geometric games with k players is Θ(k). Hence, we consider the task of minimizing players incentives to deviate from a payment scheme, purchasing the minimum cost network. In contrast to general games, in small geometric games (2 players and 2 terminals per player), a Nash equilibrium purchasing the optimum network exists. This can be translated into a (1+ε)-approximate Nash equilibrium purchasing the optimum network under more practical assumptions, for any ε 0. For more players there are games with 2 terminals per player, such that any Nash equilibrium purchasing the optimum solution is at least $\left(\frac{4}{3}-\epsilon\right)$-approximate. On the algorithmic side, we show that playing small games with best-response strategies yields low-cost Nash equilibria. The distinguishing feature of our paper are new techniques to deal with the geometric setting, fundamentally different from the techniques used in [2].