Greedy strikes back: improved facility location algorithms
Journal of Algorithms
Combinatorial optimization games
SODA '97 Proceedings of the eighth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Cooperative facility location games
SODA '00 Proceedings of the eleventh annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Applications of approximation algorithms to cooperative games
STOC '01 Proceedings of the thirty-third annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
FOCS '02 Proceedings of the 43rd Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Improved Approximation Algorithms for Metric Facility Location Problems
APPROX '02 Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Approximation Algorithms for Combinatorial Optimization
SIAM Journal on Computing
Strategyproof cost-sharing mechanisms for set cover and facility location games
Proceedings of the 4th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Near-optimal network design with selfish agents
Proceedings of the thirty-fifth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Group Strategyproof Mechanisms via Primal-Dual Algorithms
FOCS '03 Proceedings of the 44th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Greedy facility location algorithms analyzed using dual fitting with factor-revealing LP
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
The Price of Stability for Network Design with Fair Cost Allocation
FOCS '04 Proceedings of the 45th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Limitations of cross-monotonic cost sharing schemes
SODA '05 Proceedings of the sixteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
STACS'99 Proceedings of the 16th annual conference on Theoretical aspects of computer science
Selfish service installation in networks
WINE'06 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Internet and Network Economics
Price of anarchy, locality gap, and a network service provider game
WINE'05 Proceedings of the First international conference on Internet and Network Economics
Mechanism design for set cover games when elements are agents
AAIM'05 Proceedings of the First international conference on Algorithmic Applications in Management
MFCS'06 Proceedings of the 31st international conference on Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science
Cost sharing and strategyproof mechanisms for set cover games
STACS'05 Proceedings of the 22nd annual conference on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science
Price of Stability in Survivable Network Design
SAGT '09 Proceedings of the 2nd International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory
Non-cooperative facility location and covering games
Theoretical Computer Science
Competitive cost sharing with economies of scale
LATIN'08 Proceedings of the 8th Latin American conference on Theoretical informatics
Cost sharing and strategyproof mechanisms for set cover games
Journal of Combinatorial Optimization
Strategic multiway cut and multicut games
WAOA'10 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Approximation and online algorithms
Survey: Covering problems in facility location: A review
Computers and Industrial Engineering
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We study a general class of non-cooperative games coming from combinatorial covering and facility location problems. A game for k players is based on an integer programming formulation. Each player wants to satisfy a subset of the constraints. Variables represent resources, which are available in costly integer units and must be bought. The cost can be shared arbitrarily between players. Once a unit is bought, it can be used by all players to satisfy their constraints. In general the cost of pure-strategy Nash equilibria in this game can be prohibitively high, as both prices of anarchy and stability are in Θ(k). In addition, deciding the existence of pure Nash equilibria is NP-hard. These results extend to recently studied single-source connection games. Under certain conditions, however, cheap Nash equilibria exist: if the integrality gap of the underlying integer program is 1 and in the case of single constraint players. In addition, we present algorithms that compute cheap approximate Nash equilibria in polynomial time.