Pricing in computer networks: reshaping the research agenda
ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review
Sharing the “cost” of multicast trees: an axiomatic analysis
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
Improved performance of the greedy algorithm for partial cover
Information Processing Letters
A threshold of ln n for approximating set cover
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Algorithmic mechanism design (extended abstract)
STOC '99 Proceedings of the thirty-first annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Applications of approximation algorithms to cooperative games
STOC '01 Proceedings of the thirty-third annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Sharing the cost of multicast transmissions
Journal of Computer and System Sciences - Special issue on Internet algorithms
A BGP-based mechanism for lowest-cost routing
Proceedings of the twenty-first annual symposium on Principles of distributed computing
Truth revelation in approximately efficient combinatorial auctions
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Strategyproof cost-sharing mechanisms for set cover and facility location games
Proceedings of the 4th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Hardness results for multicast cost sharing
Theoretical Computer Science
Group Strategyproof Mechanisms via Primal-Dual Algorithms
FOCS '03 Proceedings of the 44th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Priority service and max-min fairness
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
Limitations of cross-monotonic cost sharing schemes
SODA '05 Proceedings of the sixteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
On the value of coordination in network design
Proceedings of the nineteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
The algorithmic structure of group strategyproof budget-balanced cost-sharing mechanisms
STACS'06 Proceedings of the 23rd Annual conference on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science
Mechanism design for set cover games when elements are agents
AAIM'05 Proceedings of the First international conference on Algorithmic Applications in Management
Cost sharing and strategyproof mechanisms for set cover games
STACS'05 Proceedings of the 22nd annual conference on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science
Non-cooperative facility location and covering games
ISAAC'06 Proceedings of the 17th international conference on Algorithms and Computation
Cost sharing and strategyproof mechanisms for set cover games
STACS'05 Proceedings of the 22nd annual conference on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science
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We develop for set cover games several general cost-sharing methods that are approximately budget-balanced, in the core, and/or group-strategyproof. We first study the cost sharing for a single set cover game, which does not have a budget-balanced mechanism in the core. We show that there is no cost allocation method that can always recover more than $\frac{1}{\ln n}$ of the total cost and in the core. Here n is the number of all players to be served. We give a cost allocation method that always recovers $\frac{1}{\ln d_{\mathit{max}}}$ of the total cost, where d max is the maximum size of all sets. We then study the cost allocation scheme for all induced subgames. It is known that no cost sharing scheme can always recover more than $\frac{1}{n}$ of the total cost for every subset of players. We give an efficient cost sharing scheme that always recovers at least $\frac{1}{2n}$ of the total cost for every subset of players and furthermore, our scheme is cross-monotone. When the elements to be covered are selfish agents with privately known valuations, we present a strategyproof charging mechanism, under the assumption that all sets are simple sets; further, the total cost of the set cover is no more than ln驴d max times that of an optimal solution. When the sets are selfish agents with privately known costs, we present a strategyproof payment mechanism to them. We also show how to fairly share the payments to all sets among the elements.