Approximation algorithms for facility location problems
APPROX '00 Proceedings of the Third International Workshop on Approximation Algorithms for Combinatorial Optimization
FOCS '01 Proceedings of the 42nd IEEE symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Approximation algorithms for facility location problems
Approximation algorithms for facility location problems
Algorithmic Game Theory
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FOCS '07 Proceedings of the 48th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
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Tighter Bounds for Facility Games
WINE '09 Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
A simple and deterministic competitive algorithm for online facility location
Information and Computation
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SODA '10 Proceedings of the twenty-first annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete Algorithms
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ACM SIGACT News
SAGT'11 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Algorithmic game theory
Strategy-proof mechanisms for facility location games with many facilities
ADT'11 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Algorithmic decision theory
Approximately optimal mechanism design via differential privacy
Proceedings of the 3rd Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference
Strategyproof facility location and the least squares objective
Proceedings of the fourteenth ACM conference on Electronic commerce
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IJCAI'13 Proceedings of the Twenty-Third international joint conference on Artificial Intelligence
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Approximate Mechanism Design without Money
ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation
Theory of Computing Systems
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We study Facility Location games, where a number of facilities are placed in a metric space based on locations reported by strategic agents. A mechanism maps the agents' locations to a set of facilities. The agents seek to minimize their connection cost, namely the distance of their true location to the nearest facility, and may misreport their location. We are interested in mechanisms that are strategyproof, i.e., ensure that no agent can benefit frommisreporting her location, do not resort to monetary transfers, and approximate the optimal social cost. We focus on the closely related problems of k-Facility Location and Facility Location with a uniform facility opening cost, and mostly study winner-imposing mechanisms, which allocate facilities to the agents and require that each agent allocated a facility should connect to it. We show that the winner-imposing version of the Proportional Mechanism (Lu et al., EC '10) is stategyproof and 4k-approximate for the k-Facility Location game. For the Facility Location game, we show that the winner-imposing version of the randomized algorithm of (Meyerson, FOCS '01), which has an approximation ratio of 8, is strategyproof. Furthermore, we present a deterministic non-imposing group strategyproof O(log n)-approximate mechanism for the Facility Location game on the line.