Algorithmic mechanism design (extended abstract)
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Approximate mechanism design without money
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Approximate Mechanism Design without Money
ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation
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We consider mechanisms without payments for the problem of scheduling unrelated machines. Specifically, we consider truthful in expectation randomized mechanisms under the assumption that a machine (player) is bound by its reports: when a machine lies and reports value tij for a task instead of the actual one tij, it will execute for time tij if it gets the task--unless the declared value tij is less than the actual value tij, in which case, it will execute for time tij. Our main technical result is an optimal mechanism for one task and n players which has approximation ratio (n + 1)/2. We also provide a matching lower bound, showing that no other truthful mechanism can achieve a better approximation ratio. This immediately gives an approximation ratio of (n + 1)/2 and n(n + 1)/2 for social cost and makespan minimization, respectively, for any number of tasks.