On the power of deterministic mechanisms for facility location games

  • Authors:
  • Dimitris Fotakis;Christos Tzamos

  • Affiliations:
  • School of Electrical and Computer Engineering, National Technical University of Athens, Athens, Greece;Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence Laboratory, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA

  • Venue:
  • ICALP'13 Proceedings of the 40th international conference on Automata, Languages, and Programming - Volume Part I
  • Year:
  • 2013

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Abstract

We investigate the approximability of K-Facility Location by deterministic strategyproof mechanisms. Our main result is an elegant characterization of deterministic strategyproof mechanisms with a bounded approximation ratio for 2-Facility Location on the line. Specifically, we show that for instances with n≥5 agents, any such mechanism either admits a unique dictator, or always places the facilities at the two extremes. As a consequence, we obtain that the best approximation ratio achievable by deterministic strategyproof mechanisms for 2-Facility Location on the line is precisely n−2. Employing a technical tool developed for the characterization, we show that for every K≥3, there do not exist any deterministic anonymous strategyproof mechanisms with a bounded approximation ratio for K-Facility Location on the line, even for simple instances with K+1 agents. Moreover, building on the characterization for the line, we show that there do not exist any deterministic mechanisms with a bounded approximation ratio for 2-Facility Location in more general metric spaces, which is true even for simple instances with 3 agents located in a star.