FOCS '01 Proceedings of the 42nd IEEE symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Approximation algorithms for facility location problems
Approximation algorithms for facility location problems
Algorithmic Game Theory
Mechanism Design via Differential Privacy
FOCS '07 Proceedings of the 48th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Approximate mechanism design without money
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On truthfulness and approximation for scheduling selfish tasks
Journal of Scheduling
Tighter Bounds for Facility Games
WINE '09 Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
Asymptotically optimal strategy-proof mechanisms for two-facility games
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Differentially private combinatorial optimization
SODA '10 Proceedings of the twenty-first annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete Algorithms
Combinatorial auctions with verification are tractable
ESA'10 Proceedings of the 18th annual European conference on Algorithms: Part II
SAGT'11 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Algorithmic game theory
Strategy-proof mechanisms for facility location games with many facilities
ADT'11 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Algorithmic decision theory
Approximately optimal mechanism design via differential privacy
Proceedings of the 3rd Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference
Mechanism design: from partial to probabilistic verification
Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce
Scheduling selfish tasks: about the performance of truthful algorithms
COCOON'07 Proceedings of the 13th annual international conference on Computing and Combinatorics
Strategyproof facility location for concave cost functions
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On the power of deterministic mechanisms for facility location games
ICALP'13 Proceedings of the 40th international conference on Automata, Languages, and Programming - Volume Part I
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We study Facility Location games, where a number of facilities are placed in a metric space based on locations reported by strategic agents. A mechanism maps the agents' locations to a set of facilities. The agents seek to minimize their connection cost, namely the distance of their true location to the nearest facility, and may even misreport their location. We are interested in mechanisms that are strategyproof, i.e., ensure that no agent can benefit from misreporting her location, do not resort to monetary transfers, and approximate the optimal social cost. We focus on the closely related problems of k-Facility Location and Facility Location with a uniform facility opening cost, instead of a bound of k on the number of facilities. In the former, the social cost is the agents' total connection cost, while in the latter, the social cost is the sum of the total connection cost and the total facility opening cost. We mostly study mechanisms that are winner-imposing, in the sense that they allocate facilities to agents and require that each agent allocated a facility should connect to it. We prove that the winner-imposing version of the Proportional mechanism, proposed by Lu et al. (2010) [18], is stategyproof for the k-Facility Location game, and achieves an approximation ratio of at most 4k, for any k=1. For the Facility Location game, we show that the winner-imposing version of the randomized online algorithm of Meyerson (2001) [21], which has an approximation ratio of 8, is strategyproof. Furthermore, we present a deterministic non-imposing group strategyproof O(logn)-approximate mechanism for the Facility Location game on the line. We also consider oblivious winner-imposing mechanisms for location games on continuous metric spaces, and show that they are strategyproof iff they are locally strategyproof, i.e. no agent can benefit by reporting a location arbitrarily close to her true location.