Incentive compatible regression learning
Proceedings of the nineteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Approximate mechanism design without money
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Proceedings of the 11th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Asymptotically optimal strategy-proof mechanisms for two-facility games
Proceedings of the 11th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Winner-imposing strategyproof mechanisms for multiple facility location games
WINE'10 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Internet and network economics
False-name-proofness in facility location problem on the real line
WINE'10 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Internet and network economics
Online and incremental algorithms for facility location
ACM SIGACT News
Mechanisms for obnoxious facility game on a path
COCOA'11 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Combinatorial optimization and applications
SAGT'11 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Algorithmic game theory
Mechanism design on discrete lines and cycles
Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce
Winner-imposing strategyproof mechanisms for multiple Facility Location games
Theoretical Computer Science
Strategyproof facility location and the least squares objective
Proceedings of the fourteenth ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Strategyproof facility location for concave cost functions
Proceedings of the fourteenth ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Strategy-proof approximation mechanisms for an obnoxious facility game on networks
Theoretical Computer Science
On the power of deterministic mechanisms for facility location games
ICALP'13 Proceedings of the 40th international conference on Automata, Languages, and Programming - Volume Part I
Approximate Mechanism Design without Money
ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation
Theory of Computing Systems
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In one dimensional facility games, public facilities are placed based on the reported locations of the agents, where all the locations of agents and facilities are on a real line. The cost of an agent is measured by the distance from its location to the nearest facility.We study the approximation ratio of social welfare for strategy-proof mechanisms, where no agent can benefit by misreporting its location. In this paper, we use the total cost of agents as social welfare function. We study two extensions of the simplest version as in [9]: two facilities and multiple locations per agent. In both cases, we analyze randomized strategy-proof mechanisms, and give the first lower bound of 1.045 and 1.33, respectively. The latter lower bound is obtained by solving a related linear programming problem, and we believe that this new technique of proving lower bounds for randomized mechanisms may find applications in other problems and is of independent interest.We also improve several approximation bounds in [9], and confirm a conjecture in [9].