A random graph model of kidney exchanges: efficiency, individual-rationality and incentives
Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
An improved 2-agent kidney exchange mechanism
WINE'11 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Internet and Network Economics
Privacy-aware mechanism design
Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce
Optimizing kidney exchange with transplant chains: theory and reality
Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 2
Paired and altruistic kidney donation in the UK: algorithms and experimentation
SEA'12 Proceedings of the 11th international conference on Experimental Algorithms
Harnessing the power of two crossmatches
Proceedings of the fourteenth ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Proceedings of the fourteenth ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Approximate Mechanism Design without Money
ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation
| Hi-index | 0.00 |
As multi-hospital kidney exchange clearinghouses have grown, the set of players has grown from patients and surgeons to include hospitals. Hospitals have the option of enrolling only their hard-to-match patient-donor pairs, while conducting easily arranged exchanges internally. This behavior has already started to be observed. We show that the cost of making it individually rational for hospitals to participate fully is low in almost every large exchange pool (although the worst-case cost is very high), while the cost of failing to guarantee individually rational allocations could be large, in terms of lost transplants. We also identify an incentive compatible mechanism.