On-line routing of virtual circuits with applications to load balancing and machine scheduling
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Algorithmic mechanism design (extended abstract)
STOC '99 Proceedings of the thirty-first annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Developments from a June 1996 seminar on Online algorithms: the state of the art
Truthful Mechanisms for One-Parameter Agents
FOCS '01 Proceedings of the 42nd IEEE symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
A lower bound for scheduling mechanisms
SODA '07 Proceedings of the eighteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Truthful Approximation Mechanisms for Scheduling Selfish Related Machines
Theory of Computing Systems
Truthful Approximation Schemes for Single-Parameter Agents
FOCS '08 Proceedings of the 2008 49th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Improved lower bounds for non-utilitarian truthfulness
WAOA'07 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Approximation and online algorithms
Tighter approximation bounds for LPT scheduling in two special cases
CIAC'06 Proceedings of the 6th Italian conference on Algorithms and Complexity
A lower bound of 1 + ϕ for truthful scheduling mechanisms
MFCS'07 Proceedings of the 32nd international conference on Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science
Mechanism design for fractional scheduling on unrelated machines
ICALP'07 Proceedings of the 34th international conference on Automata, Languages and Programming
| Hi-index | 5.23 |
We study the online version of the scheduling problem Q@?C"m"a"x involving selfish agents, considered by Archer and Tardos in [A. Archer, E. Tardos, Truthful mechanisms for one-parameter agents, in: Proceedings of the 42nd IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS), 2001, pp. 482-491], where jobs must be scheduled on m related machines, each of them owned by a different selfish agent. We present a general technique for transforming competitive online algorithms for Q@?C"m"a"x into truthful online mechanisms with a small loss of competitiveness. We also investigate the issue of designing new online algorithms from scratch so as to obtain efficient competitive mechanisms, and prove some lower bounds on a class of ''natural'' algorithms. A ''direct'' use of such natural algorithms to construct truthful mechanisms yields only trivial upper bounds for the case of two machines. Finally, we consider mechanisms with verification, introduced by Nisan and Ronen [N. Nisan, A. Ronen, Algorithmic mechanism design, in: Proceedings of the 31st Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, STOC, 1999, pp. 129-140], for offline scheduling problems. We present the first constant-competitive online truthful mechanism with verification for any number of machines.