Truthful germs are contagious: a local to global characterization of truthfulness
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Implementable allocation rules
ACM SIGecom Exchanges
A Characterization of 2-Player Mechanisms for Scheduling
ESA '08 Proceedings of the 16th annual European symposium on Algorithms
Characterizing Incentive Compatibility for Convex Valuations
SAGT '09 Proceedings of the 2nd International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory
WINE '09 Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
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Consider a model with finite number of goods, and with buyers with private values and quasi-linear utility functions. A domain of valuation functions for a buyer is a monotonicity domain if every finite-valued monotone randomized allocation rule defined on it is implementable, in the sense that there exists a randomized truth-telling direct mechanism that implements this allocation rule. We prove that a domain of valuations of dimension at least 2 is a monotonicity domain if and only if its closure is convex.