A monotone approximation algorithm for scheduling with precedence constraints

Authors:
Sven O. Krumke;Anne Schwahn;Rob Van Stee;Stephan Westphal
Affiliations:
Department of Mathematics, University of Kaiserslautern, P.O. Box 3049, Paul-Ehrlich-Str. 14, 67653 Kaiserslautern, Germany;Department of Mathematics, University of Kaiserslautern, P.O. Box 3049, Paul-Ehrlich-Str. 14, 67653 Kaiserslautern, Germany;Department of Computer Science, University of Karlsruhe, 76128 Karlsruhe, Germany;Department of Mathematics, University of Kaiserslautern, P.O. Box 3049, Paul-Ehrlich-Str. 14, 67653 Kaiserslautern, Germany
Venue:
Operations Research Letters
Year:
2008

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Abstract

We provide a monotone O(m^2^/^3)-approximation algorithm for scheduling related machines with precedence constraints.